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The deep-rooted Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been a 
major source of destabilization in the Middle East for some 
three-quarters of a century. Whereas other long-standing 
conflicts around the world have been brought to a close, 
this struggle (both in and of itself and within its wider 
Arab-Israeli dimension) remains a perennial tinderbox. This 
is particularly true given the unsettling realities of the 
region in which the conflict exists. Consequently, a 
certain sense of urgency for finding a permanent political 
settlement can be discerned both within the region and 
outside it. still, the search for a solution has yielded 
progress only on an interim arrangement (the Gaza-Jericho 
autonomy accord signed by Israel and the PLO September 13, 
1993). 
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To be workable, a political settlement must break new 
ground by conceptualizing the problem in terms which tran-
scend the traditional, emotion-laden and myopic rhetoric 
commonly used by both sides. This research is an attempt to 
contribute to a fresh, far-reaching understanding of the 
requisites for a secure Israeli-Palestinian peace and, on 
this basis, to evaluate the alternative scenarios for the 
ultimate disposition of the Israeli-administered West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. To that end, the fundamental question is 
which of these alternatives would go furthest in satisfying 
the vital interests of both parties so that a permanent 
settlement of the disputed territories might at last be 
implemented. 
In developing a conceptual framework for evaluating 
potential solutions, this research incorporates a compre-
hensive definition of "national security" juxtaposed with a 
concept related to American-Soviet detente: common security. 
National security means protection against all major perils 
to a state's security, not merely military threats. Common 
security is a mutual commitment to joint survival. It is 
based on a recognition that because of an increasingly 
interdependent world, states can no longer achieve security 
unilaterally but rather only through the creation of 
positive-sum processes that lead to cooperation with one 
another. The first half of this thesis, then, attempts to 
establish the essential elements of a common security 
framework for Israel and the Palestinian inhabitants of the 
West Bank and Gaza. 
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The concluding chapters of the thesis focus on the 
evaluation of five alternative scenarios for an Israeli-
Palestinian political settlement: 1) the present status 
quo: 2) the "Jordanian option," or a return to the status 
quo ante of June 1967; 3) Israeli annexation; 4) an Israel-
Jordan confederation with a Palestinian entity federally 
linked to one or both; and 5) a Palestinian state, either 
fully independent or federally connected with Israel andjor 
Jordan. Each option is assessed on the basis of the degree 
to which it would satisfy the common-security criteria 
formulated in the preceding chapters: 1) protection against 
military threats: 2) the realization of Palestinian politi-
cal self-determination; 3) the preservation of Israel's 
Jewish and democratic ideals; 4) internal (societal) and 
regional stability; 5) economic viability; and 6) the 
sufficient and equitable allocation of water resources. 
The alternative rated most favorably is the 
establishment of a sovereign, independent Palestinian state 
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in the West Bank and Gaza, excluding the Jordan Valley and 
the Jerusalem Corridor. This assessment presupposes certain 
provisions. Among these are the deployment of an American-
led multinational peacekeeping force in the Samarian 
mountains of the West Bank, the creation of an economic 
confederation and tripartite federal water authority linking 
Israel, Jordan and Arab Palestine, and a special status for 
East Jerusalem. The implementation of such a settlement, it 
is argued, would create a new modus vivendi among the Arabs 
and the Israelis, which, in turn, could serve as the under-
pinning of a durable and comprehensive peace. 
COMMON SECURITY: A CONCEPTUAL BLUEPRINT 
FOR AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN POLITICAL SETTLEMENT 
By 
ROBERT ARTHUR HORENSTEIN 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
in 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 
Portland State University 
1993 
TO THE OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES: 
The members of the Committee approve the thesis of 
Robert Arthur Horenstein presented October 29, 1993. 
-------------
John Damis, Chair 
-----------
Gjrl L. Scott 
----
David A. Horowitz 
APPROVED: 
ary L. Scott, Chair, Department of Political Science 
~~~~-;~~~i~~-~~~-;~~~~;~~-
iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The writing of a meaningful thesis on the search for an 
Israeli-Palestinian peace is, to say the least, an immensely 
arduous and time-consuming project. I would like to thank 
Professors Gary L. Scott and John Damis, without whose 
abundant moral support and insightful advice this paper 
would not have been possible. 
---R.A.H., October, 1993 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS • • . . • . . • • . . . • . . • . . . . . iii 
CHAPTER 
I 
II 
INTRODUCTION • . . . . . . . 1 
Historical Background . • • • 2 
Overview of Research Goals . 10 
Chapter I Notes . • 16 
A ZERO-SUM CONFLICT? . . 17 
Irreconcilable Territorial Claims . . . . . 18 
Historical Rights 
Moral Imperatives 
Obligations Under International Law 
Chapter II Notes . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
III COMMON SECURITY: ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN STYLE .. 33 
Common Security Defined . . . . • 36 
Principles 
What is National Security? 
Military Security v. Self-Determination .. 42 
Support for a Settlement and Internal 
Stability .............. 47 
The Demographic Threat . . . . . . . . . . 51 
v 
III (Cont.) 
IV 
v 
common Economic Security . . . . . . . . . 53 
Costs of the Conflict 
Interdependence 
Economic Instability 
Common Economic Market 
Common Water Security . . 64 
Chapter III Notes . . 69 
NON-SETTLEMENT AND THE JORDANIAN OPTION 
Non-Settlement 
Military Security v. Self-
Determination 
Implications of the Status Quo for 
Internal Stability 
Impact on Common Economic/Water 
Security 
. 74 
75 
A Return to 1967? . . • . . . . . . . . . . 81 
Secure Borders 
Self-Determination Through Jordanian 
Citizenship? 
Implications for Internal Stability 
Impact on Common Economic/Water 
Security 
Chapter IV Notes . . . . . . . . . . . 
UNilATERAL ISRAELI ANNEXATION 
94 
97 
Political Equality Within a Greater Israel? 98 
Population Transfer . . . • 102 
Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 109 
Territorial Autonomy 
Autonomy v. Self-Determination 
Chapter V Notes .............. 117 
vi 
VI THE FEDERAL APPROACH: SELF-RULE AND SHARED RULE 120 
Impact on Military Security • . . . . . .. 123 
Meaningful Self-Determination? . . . . . . 125 
Implications for Israel's Jewish and 
Democratic Nature . . . . . . . . . . 127 
Economic Integration and Sharing of 
Water Resources . . . . . . . . . . . 128 
Palestinian Dissatisfaction and Internal 
Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 
Chapter VI Notes . . . . . . . . . • . . . 134 
VII ARAB PALESTINE • . . • • . 136 
The Ultimate Form of Self-Determination .. 137 
Implications for Israeli Military Security 138 
Sovereignty v. Security Arrangements . . . 14 3 
Internal Stability: Support for the 
Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 
Elimination of the Demographic Time Bomb .. 152 
Common Economic Security or Severance 
of Economic Ties? . . . . . . . . . . 153 
A Federal Arrangement for Water Allocation 155 
Chapter VII Notes . 
VIII CONCLUSION . . . 
The Question of Jerusalem . . . 
Partial Demilitarization 
Timeframe for Implementation 
A Final Word 
Chapter VIII Notes 
. 158 
. 161 
. 162 
. 164 
. 165 
. 166 
. 169 
vii 
REFERENCES CITED •.••................. 170 
APPENDICES 
A 
B 
MIDDLE EAST BALANCE OF POWER 
PROPOSED BOUNDARIES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND A 
PALESTINIAN STATE • . . . . . . . . . 
175 
176 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The deep-rooted Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been a 
major source of destabilization in the Middle East for some 
three-quarters of a century. Essential to any feasible 
solution of this conflict is the need to break new ground by 
conceptualizing the problem in terms which transcend the 
traditional, emotion-laden and myopic rhetoric commonly used 
by both sides. 
This is not to say that to be workable, the ultimate 
solution of this problem must simply be bold enough to 
disregard completely the contradictory historical 
perspectives of the parties or ignore their profound ideo-
logical sensitivities. However, one of the major premises 
of this paper is that it is essential for Israelis and 
Palestinians to move beyond their contentious claims and 
counterclaims which are basically of a historical, moral or 
quasi-legal nature. As will be seen, these are nothing more 
than a recipe for perpetual gridlock. More importantly, it 
is only by adhering to a principle of common security, 
broadly defined, that these two peoples will ultimately find 
a resolution to their struggle for possession of and 
sovereignty over the same land. 
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The past several years have witnessed the occurrence of 
several groundbreaking events in the Arab-Israeli arena. 
Among these milestones have been the onset of the Pales-
tinian Intifada (uprising) ; the November 1988 endorsement of a 
two-state solution by the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO); the historic convening of direct, bilateral Arab-
Israeli negotiations in the aftermath of the 1991 Persian 
Gulf War; the victory of a left-of-center Labor Party in the 
1992 Israeli elections; and, most recently, a mutual 
recognition accord and autonomy agreement between Israel and 
the PLO after months of secret talks in Norway. 
Nevertheless, in some respects, a final resolution of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is only a modicum closer to 
reality than when the Palestinians began their uprising in 
late 1987. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Because it is important to understand how the Israelis 
and Palestinians arrived at their present state of mutual 
animosity and frequent impasse, this study would be remiss 
if it did not provide a brief historical overview of their 
struggle within the context of the wider Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Reflective of the seeming intractability of the 
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problem is the fact that the historical roots of the 
conflict can be traced back long before Israel's acquisition 
of the West Bank and Gaza strip in 1967. It was during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century when Arab nationalism, 
which started as a reaction against Ottoman hegemony, and 
Zionism, the movement to establish a Jewish national home in 
Palestine so that Jews could once and for all be insulated 
from anti-Semitism and assimilation, began to emerge in 
earnest. Thus, for over one-hundred years, the two national 
movements have been on a collision course with regard to the 
land which the Arabs refer to as Palestine and which the 
Jews call Eretz Israel (present-day Israel proper plus the 
West Bank and Gaza). 1 
After the defeat of the Ottomans (Turkey) in World War 
I, the victorious Allied Powers in the form of the new 
League of Nations carved up the Arab provinces of the former 
Ottoman Empire into mandates assigned to Great Britain and 
France. Britain acquired the mandate for Palestine and 
retained administrative responsibility for that territory 
until 1948. Even before the end of the war, the British 
government, in accordance with the Balfour Declaration of 
1917, pledged its support for the establishment a Jewish 
national home in Palestine. Simultaneously, it promised the 
Arab nationalists it would assist them in the creation of an 
independent Arab state in Greater Syria, initially including 
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Palestine. That such commitments were contradictory and 
seemingly impossible to reconcile did not bother the British 
as long as their immediate strategic interests were being 
served. 
Between the world wars and thereafter, however, the 
British began to grasp the extent of Arab nationalist 
opposition to the increasing Zionist presence in Palestine, 
culminating in the Arab riots of 1936-39. They believed it 
politically expedient to try to appease the Arabs by 
limiting Jewish immigration into the area. The Zionists, 
meanwhile, continued to insist even more adamantly that the 
British permit large~scale Jewish immigration and settlement 
in accordance with their earlier pledges, whose urgency was 
now greatly underscored by the revelations of Nazi 
atrocities against the Jews in Europe. The escalating 
conflict among the Arab nationalists, British and Zionists 
notwithstanding, the latter managed to expand considerably 
their presence in Palestine: by 1940, Jews numbered 467,000, 
or thirty percent of the total population. 2 
After World War II, amid the horrifying disclosure 
that nearly ninety percent of European Jewry had been 
exterminated, international pressure mounted on Britain to 
open up immediately the gates of Palestine to an additional 
100,000 Jewish refugees. The British, fearful of what would 
undoubtedly be a hostile reaction in the Arab world to the 
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admission of so many Jewish emigres, refused. By early 
1947, however, they had become weary of the ongoing conflict 
in Palestine. In February, the British government, already 
badly overextended throughout its far-flung empire, 
announced that it was turning over the problem of Palestine 
to the newly created United Nations. 
On November 29, 1947, the U.N. General Assembly voted 
33 to 13, with ten abstentions, to accept the plan endorsed 
by a majority of the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine 
(UNSCOP): the partition of Palestine west of the Jordan 
River into two sovereign states, one Arab, the other Jewish. 
In addition, Jerusalem and its surroundings were to be 
internationalized under permanent U.N. trusteeship. Thus, 
the right of the Jews to an independent state in part of 
Palestine--as well as the irreconcilability of the claims by 
these two peoples to the same geographic domain--was once 
and for all confirmed by the international community. 
The Zionists, eager for international recognition of 
their right to statehood, accepted the partition proposal. 
The Palestinian Arabs, however, backed unanimously by the 
Arab states, rejected partition because they had for so long 
constituted an overwhelming--albeit declining--majority of 
the population in Palestine. As a result, civil war 
immediately erupted between the Jewish and Arab inhabitants. 
In May 1948, as the mandate expired and the last British 
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troops were withdrawn, the Zionists proclaimed the birth of 
the modern state of Israel, which was immediately invaded by 
the expeditionary forces of five Arab states. Thus, what 
had been violent intercommunal discord rapidly escalated 
into the first full-fledged Arab-Israeli war. 
As a result of Israel's war of independence, the 
Zionists not o~ly secured their fledgling state but, in 
addition, captured sections in the Galilee, Jerusalem and 
Negev regions which had originally been allocated to Arab 
Palestine by the U.N. partition plan. The West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, or the remainder of what was to be the Arab 
state, were occupied by Jordan and Egypt, respectively. For 
the Palestinian Arabs, both the civil war and the wider 
Arab-Israeli war were devastating: of the approximately 
860,000 Arabs who had lived in that part of Palestine which 
was now the state of Israel (based on the 1949 armistice 
lines), 727,000 fled, or, in some cases, were expelled. Of 
these, 470,000 entered refugee camps in the West Bank and 
Gaza while most of the remainder were scattered among 
Lebanon, Syria and Jordan proper. 3 
During the next forty years, there were five more Arab-
Israeli wars, in 1956, 1967, 1969-70, 1973 and 1982. In the 
monumental 1967 Six-Day War, Israel preempted an imminent 
Arab invasion and defeated Egypt, Jordan and Syria, thereby 
acquiring the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza 
(as well as the Golan Heights from Syria). Israel has been 
in control of these territories ever since--in fact, it has 
unilaterally annexed East Jerusalem and the Golan--and is 
governing the 1.9 million Palestinian Arabs therein. 
Whether refugees from the 1947-48 war or indigenous inhab-
itants, these Palestinians consider the West Bank and Gaza, 
at a minimum, to be their national homeland. Still, the 
intifada, that Palestinian ground swell to "shake off" what 
is considered to be an illegal Israeli occupation of Arab 
lands, erupted only after twenty years of Israeli rule. 
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There can be no question that the Palestinian residents 
of the West Bank and Gaza have always felt that Israeli 
control of what they consider to be their national territory 
is contrary to their vital interests and collective rights. 
But not until the last decade did critical events unfold 
which placed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at a 
crossroads. 
By the early 1980's, a dramatic rise in the number of 
Jewish settlements in the administered territories along 
with a large-scale expansion of existing ones began to take 
place. This increase occurred against a backdrop of a 
political trend in Israel which seemed to reflect a growing 
shift toward both the secular and religious right (i.e., 
toward a sentiment favoring the incorporation of the West 
Bank and Gaza into a Greater Israel). Compounding the· 
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resultant sense of frustration among the Palestinians were 
the defeat of the PLO in Lebanon in 1982-1983 and the Arab 
states' subsequent inattentiveness toward and inability (if 
not reluctance) to do anything about the Israeli occupation. 
Perhaps the largest disappointment for the Palestinians was 
the November 1987 Arab League summit in Amman. At this 
gathering of Arab leaders, the Iran-Iraq war was given 
primacy while the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was placed on 
the diplomatic back burner. 
Clearly, it has been Israel's rapid settlement drive in 
the territories along with a concomitant effort to link the 
settlements institutionally and economically to Israel 
proper which has ultimately reinforced the perception among 
the Palestinian population that a solution to their 
predicament is not close at hand. In 1977, ten years after 
the Israeli conquest of the West Bank and Gaza, the Jewish 
population there was still quite small, less than 4,500. By 
contrast, in 1988, after more than a decade of right-wing 
Likud rule, 130 settlements with 65,000 residents were 
dispersed throughout the territories, making it increasingly 
doubtful that this "creeping annexation" could ever be 
reversed. 4 
As of this writing, the Jewish population in the 
territories, boosted in large part by a housing blitz 
{20,000 building starts) launched in the last two years of 
the preceding Likud administration, has increased to well 
over 120,000 in some 140 settlements. There are an 
additional 150,000 Jews residing in East Jerusalem and its 
five satellite towns. Mark Heller and Sari Nusseibeh 
estimate, moreover, that 41 percent of the West Bank alone 
has been directly seized by the Israeli government as 
"public (state] land. 115 
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In the first eight months of 1993, secret Israeli-FLO 
negotiations held in Norway produced the outline of an 
interim settlement on autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho. This 
agreement, signed on September 13 in Washington following an 
exchange of statements by the parties formally recognizing 
each other's legitimacy, is a major conceptual breakthrough 
with potentially far-reaching ramifications. Nevertheless, 
some Palestinians continue their resistance in the West Bank 
and Gaza, albeit on a much more sporadic, less intense level 
than that which the intifada possessed in its formative 
years~ Without continued progress in the diplomatic arena, 
another violent eruption in the territories cannot be ruled 
out; indeed, it may be imminent. 
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OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH GOALS 
The purpose of this research is to attempt to 
contribute to a fresh, far-reaching understanding of the 
requisites for a secure Israeli-Palestinian peace and, on 
this basis, to evaluate the alternative scenarios for the 
ultimate disposition of the Israeli-controlled West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. To that end, the basic question is which of 
these alternatives would go furthest in satisfying the vital 
interests of both the Israelis and the Palestinians so that 
a permanent settlement of the disputed territories might at 
last be implemented. 
Chapter Two begins with an examination of what this 
study refers to as the zero-sum approaches to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. These not only have pervaded the 
rhetoric used by both sides but have also made their way 
into the vast array of lite~ature on the subject. Specifi-
cally, this chapter stresses the need to move beyond such 
approaches, whose overt subjectivity and polemic nature 
hardly render them conducive to compromise formulas. Taking 
it one step further in the search for a political solution, 
the Israelis and Palestinians must eventually come to 
understand that their fundamental interests, like their 
destinies, are unalterably bound together. It will 
therefore get them nowhere to seek illusory gains vis-a-vis 
the other which are mutually exclusive. Included in the latter 
category are one-sided security advantages that ensure the 
national survival of one at the expense of the other. 
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Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas argue that the concept 
of security must include protection against all significant 
threats to the national well-being, not merely military 
threats, which in the past were seen as the only real danger 
to national survival. They note, moreover, that the quest 
for such an all-encompassing security "is rapidly becoming a 
positive-sum process, whereby national well-being is achieved 
jointly by all ..• or not at all [emphasis added] . 116 In other 
words, whereas security goals (e.g., defense against enemy 
attack) might once have been pursued through zero-sum, 
unilateral actions (e.g., the conquest and annexation of 
enemy territory), now the achievement of such goals 
necessitates a positive-sum approach·7 
This is precisely why many observers believe that the 
current Arab-Israeli multilateral discussions taking place 
in various world capitals may provide the impetus for 
substantive breakthroughs in the more prominent Washington-
based, direct bilateral talks between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors. For it is problems such as arms control, 
hindered economic development, scarcity of water resources 
and the environment--all security concerns by Klare and 
Thomas's definition--which require the parties to adopt a 
positive-sum outlook. It is these sorts of intricate, 
region-wide issues which compel long-time enemies to grasp 
the necessity for cooperation and compromise if they are 
ever to be truly resolved. 
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The notion of "common security" may be particularly 
instructive here. The concept is generally associated with 
East-West relations during the Cold War, but it is equally 
applicable to the Middle East with its ubiquitous stockpiles 
of ballistic missiles and chemical and biological weapons. 
As Thomas Risse-Kappen notes, "Common security means that, 
in the nuclear age, neither side can feel secure if one side 
feels threatened."8 
Risse-Kappen argues that a cessation of the Cold War 
did not even become a realistic possibility until the mid-
1980's when the u.s.-soviet detente process finally 
instituted common security as the underlying philosophy 
governing the East-West conflict. Specifically, it was only 
after the ascendancy of Mikhail Gorbachev, who embraced this 
concept, that the u.s.-soviet arms control negotiations 
developed into a positive-sum process. This transformation 
ultimately enabled the two sides to make significant, 
mutually verifiable nuclear and conventional arms cuts. 9 
Thus, adherence to the notion of common security was, 
arguably, a necessary--albeit perhaps insufficient--
condition for an end to the Cold War. 
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Chapter Three borrows from the Klare-Thomas framework 
juxtaposed with this Cold War notion of common security. It 
applies these two complementary perspectives to the specific 
situation confronting Israel and the Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza as well as to the wider Arab-Israeli 
conflict inasmuch as it is directly relevant to the latter. 
That is, this study not only considers the relevance of 
common security to the highly militarized and volatile 
Middle East: it extrapolates further by examining the 
concept's applicability to the multitude of threats, not all 
military, which the Israelis and Palestinians pose to each 
other's well-being (and in Israel's case, perhaps to its 
very survival as a democratic and Jewish state). The 
fundamental question addressed in this chapter is: if 
common security is to be invoked as the conceptual framework 
underlying Israeli-Palestinian coexistence, which elements 
must be included? 
The concluding chapters of this research analyze 
alternative scenarios concerning the ultimate disposition of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Each scenario is evaluated on 
the basis of the comprehensive common security framework 
developed in Chapter Three. The five most widely discussed 
alternatives are examined: 1) the present status quo, or 
what some authors refer to as non-settlement of the 
conflict: 2) the "Jordanian option," or a return to the 
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status quo ante of June 1967; 3) three versions of Israeli 
annexation of the territories, each different in terms of 
its implications for the Palestinian inhabitants--Israeli 
citizenship, population transfer and autonomy; 4) an Israel-
Jordan confederation with a Palestinian entity federally 
linked to one or both; and 5) a Palestinian state, either 
fully independent or federally connected with Israel andjor 
Jordan. 
Whereas some long-standing conflicts around the world 
have been brought to a close, the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict (both in and of itself and within its wider Arab-
Israeli dimension) remains a perennial tinderbox. This is 
particularly true because of the unsettling realities of the 
region in which the conflict exists: a nuclear-armed Israel 
encircled by autocratic Arab states, themselves possessing 
ballistic missiles and unconventional weapons; a violent, 
albeit sporadic, uprising in the West Bank and Gaza; a 
troublesome number of overcrowded slums in large Arab urban 
centers and squalid Palestinian refugee camps, both serving 
as fertile ground for the spread of a militant brand of 
Islamic fundamentalism; and a history of military inter-
vention by outside powers. 
Unquestionably, a certain sense of urgency for finding 
a permanent political solution to the conflict exists 
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outside the Middle East as well as within the region itself. 
Nevertheless, the search for that solution has yielded 
progress only on an interim arrangement (the Gaza-Jericho 
plan). This study is an attempt to examine an old, 
seemingly unsolvable problem from a _fr~ pers~ectJ:ve. 
.._.~~;·;7 
The 
,"·( 
intention is to demonstrate that, for both sides, the 
benefits of compromise, order and cooperation engendered by 
the notion of common security outweigh those derived from 
unyielding adherence to abstract historical, moral and 
quasi-legal title claims on the disputed territories. 
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CHAPTER I NOTES 
1It should be noted that present-day Jordan was also 
originally included as part of the Palestine mandate 
assigned to Great Britain by the League of Nations at the 
San Remo Conference of April 1920. However, by the time the 
mandate was officially approved in July 1922, Britain had 
already unilaterally severed what was then Transjordan, 
placing·it under a separate administration. Some right-wing 
Israelis thus consider Jordan as a large portion of the 
original Land of Israel which was already "conceded" to the 
Arabs. For a discussion on this point see, Raphael Israeli, 
Palestinians Between Israel and Jordan: Squaring the 
Triangle (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991) 81-85. 
2charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988) 107. 
3Ibid., 147. 
4Israeli, op. cit., 104. Note: The above figure does 
not include the more than 100,000 Israeli Jews who were 
living in East Jerusalem and its environs as of 1988. 
5Mark A. Heller and Sari Nusseibeh, No Trumpets. No 
Drums: A Two-State Settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991) 100. 
~ichael T. Klare and Daniel c. Thomas, eds., World 
Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1991) 3. 
7Ibid. I 2-5. 
8Thomas Risse-Kappen, "From Mutual Containment to 
Common Security: Europe During and After the Cold War," in 
Klare and Thomas, eds., op. cit., 132. 
9Ibid. I 129-133. 
CHAPTER II 
A ZERO-SUM CONFLICT? 
Eretz Israel is an absolute entity whose essence does not 
depend on any political factor ... An Israeli [government} 
which limits or inhibits the settlement of Israel by its 
people loses both its virtue and importance, and in the final 
analysis its moral and legal authority altogether ... 
--Rabbi Jacob Ariel, 
Gush Emunim 1 
Prior to an analysis of the concept of common security 
in Chapter 3, this chapter first examines its antithesis: 
zero-sum approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Unlike common security, which relies strictly on positive-
sum processes (see Chapters 1 and 3), many of the title 
claims on the disputed territories advanced by both sides of 
the conflict envisage only "winner-take-all" scenarios. A 
positive-sum approach would ensure that the vital interests 
of both the Israelis and Palestinians are at least partially 
satisfied. By contrast, zero-sum approaches, like the one 
reflected in the position of Rabbi Ariel (above), insist on 
solutions which benefit exclusively one party at the partial 
or total expense of the other. 
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IRRECONCILABLE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS 
Why are the West Bank and, to a lesser extent, the Gaza 
Strip so important to Israel? Why has a sizable minority of 
the Israeli population for more than two decades championed 
the creation of faits accomplis--the Jewish settlements--in 
order to achieve a de facto (and, according to its inter-
pretation, legal) annexation of this land? Israelis offer 
several rationales for their insistence on retaining the 
territories, among them strategic, historical, religious 
(moral), and economic. 
Israel is surrounded by a hostile and embittered Arab 
world (with the significant exception of Egypt) and has now 
suffered through seven wars with its neighbors and numerous 
terrorist infiltrations inside its borders. Most Israelis, 
therefore, feel that their country requires a margin of 
security in the form of the West Bank to compensate for its 
tiny size and vulnerable shape, relatively small population 
and history of anguish. 
A much smaller percentage of Israelis hark back to 
Biblical times and the covenant between God and Abraham as 
"evidence" of a corollary title claim to Eretz Israel, which 
includes both the West Bank and Gaza. Others, right-wing 
religious Zionists, believe that withdrawal from the 
territories would be tantamount to forfeiture of redemption, 
thereby precluding the coming of the messianic age in which 
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Israel is to be a "light unto nations." Still others can 
point to the economic advantages afforded by possession of 
the territories, some of which have persisted even after the 
advent of the intifada: manpower and, to a lesser extent, 
markets for Israeli industries and a supplemental supply of 
badly needed water. 
Unfortunately for the Israelis, the Palestinians can 
also put forth a multitude of arguments establishing title 
to this land. These claims, if not in all cases parallel to 
those advanced by their Jewish counterparts, are just as 
cogent. Yet in the practical sense of finding a political 
solution to this extremely intricate problem, what is the 
significance of these arguments and counterarguments about 
which so much has been written? 
A basic criticism of those writers who approach this 
contentious, emotion-laden subject from a historical, moral 
or international legal standpoint is that they make the 
fundamental mistake of viewing·the conflict in essentially 
zero-sum terms. This is due to the irreconcilable nature of 
the variables involved. The Israelis and Palestinians must 
come to understand that getting past these irreconcilable 
territorial claims is thus a necessary, albeit insufficient, 
condition for resolving the conflict. 
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Historical Rights 
It is inconceivable that the disposition of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip could be formulated on the basis of 
historical rights. As scholarly and, for that matter, 
general interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict has swelled, a 
proliferation of literature dealing with Israeli and 
Palestinian history has occurred. One scholar, for example, 
recently wrote an entire text on the conflict largely 
because of the perceived need to produce once and for all a 
"satisfactory" account of Arab-Zionist relations in the pre-
1948 era. 2 
In another well-known work, the author concludes that 
in the period from 1947 to 1949, the vast majority of Arabs 
residing in that part of Palestine which was to become 
present-day Israel proper had actually only recently 
emigrated there from other Arab lands. 3 The corollary, that 
the Palestinians' historical claims on parts of Israel--if 
not on portions of the West Bank and Gaza as well--are a 
complete fabrication, was scathingly repudiated in a 
subsequent work by a Palestinian scholar. 4 Nevertheless, 
the great ongoing debate over which people is the rightful 
inheritor of this land can never be settled. 
Israelis by and large feel that from a strictly historical 
perspective, they are, at least theoretically, entitled to all 
of Eretz Israel due to several factors: the Biblical 
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promise made to the Jewish people (the fact that it was made 
4,000 years ago notwithstanding); their uninterrupted 
presence on this land from 1000 B.C.E. until their forced 
eviction by the Romans in 70 C.E.; their continuous 
collective yearning for an end to their exile and a return 
to Palestine; and, more recently, their conquest of the West 
Bank and Gaza by means of what, in their view, was a 
legitimate defensive war. 
Diametrically opposed to these arguments is the 
Palestinian Arab viewpoint, summarized by Sari Nusseibeh: 
Palestinians essentially believe that any 
bargaining with Israel over Palestinian territory 
is like bargaining over stolen property with the 
very thief who stole it by force ... Unlike the 
Jews, who were dispossessed of a territorial (and 
therefore objective) continuity and who perhaps 
therefore compensated for this through a highly 
developed sense of continuous collective self-
consciousness, Palestinian Arab continuity has 
been objective rather than subjective. Thus, 
while it may be true that there is no subjective 
thread (until the emergence of Islam) linking the 
various· Arab·communities who lived and ruled in 
Palestine through history, yet this is not 
regarded by present-day Palestinians as in any 
sense undermining their historical rightful claim 
to the country ••• 5 
Not only will this debate never be resolved, it is, 
moreover, critical to understand that rights which derive 
from history, particularly ancient but also contemporary 
history, are indivisible and therefore leave no room for a 
compromise formula among the disputants. Israeli and 
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Palestinian historical claims on the geographical domain in 
question fundamentally contradict and invalidate one 
another. Neither side, therefore, can concede the other's 
right to a national territory without essentially 
discrediting its own historical position. 
Moral Imperatives 
If no political settlement conceived on the basis of 
historical rights is imaginable, one could hardly envisage a 
solution to the conflict formulated on the basis of moral or 
ideological imperatives. After all, morality is even more 
subjective than history. The obvious question which arises, 
then, is, "whose morality?" 
The Palestinians share an entrenched conviction that 
they are living under an oppressive occupation. Particularly 
since the onset of the intifada, the Israeli military has 
imposed a number of individual and collective punishments on 
the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza which 
the latter regard as nothing short of a blatant deprivation 
of their fundamental human rights. 
In an effort to quell the recurring violent disruptions 
of law and order in the territories spawned by the uprising, 
Israel has frequently resorted to harsh measures. These 
include: beatings; deportation; administrative detention of 
up to one year; demolition of the homes of suspected 
perpetrators of violence; military curfews; school closures; 
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confiscation of personal property belonging to residents who 
are discovered to be in tax arrears; and the issuance of new 
magnetic ID cards as a means of preventing suspected 
troublemakers or their family members from entering Israel 
to work. An argument for withdrawal from the territories 
often heard within leftist circles in Israel is that if this 
subjugation of a people against its will should continue, it 
will inevitably tear the moral fabric of Israeli society. 6 
Many Israelis, on the other hand, simply do not believe 
they are under any moral obligation to surrender this land 
to the Palestinians. Any valid moral judgment of the manner 
by which Israel governs the territories, they argue, must 
incorporate as its standard the behavior of Western 
democracies (let alone that of Israel's autocratic Arab 
neighbors) in similar conditions of war and insurrection. Israel, which 
has implemented specific safeguards to ensure the basic 
rights of the Arab residents of the West Bank and Gaza, 
arguably has a relatively reasonable (albeit far from 
perfect) human-rights record even according to this high 
standard. 7 
In addition to these safeguards, marked improvements 
have been made in the general quality of life of the 
inhabitants of the territories since 1967. Among these are: 
advances in agricultural technology and productivity; the 
chartering of six institutions of higher learning and the 
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establishment of several vocational training centers for the 
local population; improved health services, including child 
immunization programs and the availability of quality 
.medical facilities in Israel proper when necessary; and the 
development of infrastructure, such as electrification and 
roads. Both access to publicly provided services and the 
opportunity to improve one's standard of living have thus 
generally been much better satisfied since Israel's takeover 
of the territories. As Raphael Israeli points out, are not 
these two of the most fundamental of human rights in any 
society?8 
And what of the morality of the right-wing religious 
Zionists, such as Rabbis Moshe Levinger and Eliezer Waldman? 
This disproportionately influential sector of the Israeli 
population believes that withdrawal by Israel from the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip would be contrary to God's intentions, 
thereby constituting blasphemy. In their view, the fact 
that the Jews, until 1967, did not possess control of such 
holy places as the Cote/ and the Machpela 9 was the result of a 
tragic historical injustice. More importantly, no abstract 
notion of human rights for the Arab inhabitants of the 
territories, whom these Israelis regard as "alien" resi-
dents, can be permitted to have primacy over--and thereby 
undermine--the collective right of the Jewish nation to its 
sacred, indivisible land. 10 
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It should be apparent, even from this small sampling of 
contradictory moral viewpoints, that those who seek to 
invoke a "higher" principle of morality to determine the 
parameters within which to resolve the conflict are only 
deluding themselves. 
Obligations Under International Law 
Nor is this the sort of conflict which can be settled 
on the basis of widely accepted international legal or 
quasi-legal principles. Again, the problem is one of 
irreconcilably opposed perspectives and interpretations, 
particularly regarding Israeli sovereignty over the 
territories. On this core issue, Israel and the 
Palestinians begin from entirely different points of 
departure. 
Successive Israeli governments since the Six-Day War 
have always declared as a matter of principle their 
compliance with the restrictions of the 1949 Fourth Geneva 
Convention governing occupied enemy territory (e.g., those 
dealing with the appropriation of private property for 
military purposes). Nevertheless, the Israelis have never 
considered themselves irrefutably obligated to do so because 
of what they still see as an open question of whether in 
fact the territories became "occupied" in 1967, as the 
Palestinians insist, or were "liberated" in a defensive 
war. 11 After all, the argument goes, when these territories 
were acquired by Israel they did not belong to Jordan and 
Egypt, who had captured them through acts of aggression in 
the 1948 war. 
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Withdrawal from the .territories (including East 
Jerusalem) because -of international legal imperatives might 
be mistakenly interpreted by the international community as 
an admission by Israel that it has all along been in illegal 
occupation of what are indisputably Arab lands. No Israeli 
government, whether led by Likud or Labor, would ever 
concede even part of the West Bank and Gaza on that basis. 
The problem with the Israeli position, on the one hand, 
is that the territories could only have been "liberated" if 
they had definitively belonged to the modern state of Israel 
in the first place. Valid claims to the effect that Judea 
and Samaria (the Biblical names referring to the present-day 
West Bank) formed the heart of Ancient Israel notwith-
standing, this simply is not the case at any point in 
contemporary history prior to 1967. True, Israel did not 
acquire the West Bank and Gaza through an act of aggression 
a la the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait or the Chinese takeover of 
Tibet. However, were all bilateral disputants in conflicts 
of this nature to embrace the sort of attitude that would 
portray any captured enemy territory as liberated (or, for 
that matter, terra nullius) , political settlements would be 
virtually unimaginable. 
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On the other hand, the Arab assertion that the entirety 
of the West Bank and Gaza belongs exclusively to the 
Palestinians seems to lose at least some of its legitimacy 
if one considers that when Jordan and Egypt controlled these 
territories, the Arabs collectively made no attempt to 
establish an independent Palestinian state. More 
importantly, absolute insistence that the territories are 
occupied Palestinian Arab land--including East Jerusalem, 
which was to be internationalized under the 1947 U.N. 
partition resolution--would seem to leave no room for even 
limited territorial compromise. In the practical sense, then, 
Palestinian claims differ little from right-wing Israeli 
declarations that the territories constitute liberated 
Jewish land. 
U.N. Resolution 242. Nowhere can the zero-sum nature 
of this aspect of the conflict be better seen than in U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 242, or what Nadav Safran calls 
"that masterpiece of ambiguity. " 12 Adopted in November 1967 
in the wake of the Six-Day War, the resolution was carefully 
worded so that the Arabs and Israelis could both read into 
it exactly what they wanted. Its preamble stresses "the 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and 
the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every 
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state in the area can live in security." It then calls for 
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from 
territories occupied in the recent conflict; 
(ii) termination of all claims or states of 
belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement 
of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of every state in the area 
and their right to live in peace within secure and 
recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of 
force. 
Notably, the definite article was deliberately omitted 
from the resolution's clause concerning Israeli withdrawal 
(i.e., it reads withdrawal "from territories" rather than 
"from [the] territories"). Although the Arabs were assured 
by the Soviets that the omission was insignificant, Israel 
read the clause to mean that it would not be obligated to 
withdraw from all the land which it had acquired in an act 
of self-defense. 13 The operative phrase for Israel, 
moreover, was to be found not in the first, but the second 
clause: "secure" boundaries. The latter, in the Israeli 
view, could only be interpreted as requiring not insig-
nificant revisions of the 1949 armistice lines. 
While the Israelis understand that a state cannot 
truly have secure boundaries if, as the second clause 
acknowledges, they are not also recognized boundaries, their 
interpretation of 242 (or the Arab interpretation, depending 
on one's point of view) presents a seemingly insoluble 
dilemma. The Palestinians and each of the Arab states 
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demand that Israel, at a minimum, return to the pre-1967 
borders. The latter, presumably, would constitute 
recognized, permanent boundaries although other than Egypt, 
the Arabs have never offered any formal guarantees to that 
effect. The Israelis, however, adamantly contend that total 
withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza would leave them with 
borders which, even if formally recognized by the Arabs, 
provide no strategic depth and are therefore simply not 
secure. 
If the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be settled 
on the basis of historical rights, moral imperatives andjor 
international. legal obligations because of the zero-sum 
(i.e., irreconcilable) nature of these overlapping factors, 
then on what basis can it be resolved? Clearly, any 
potential solution must at least partially satisfy the vital 
interests of both of the parties. Yet, certain perceived 
interests, it has been demonstrated, profoundly conflict 
with those of the adversary because they derive from one 
side's subjective version of history, moral doctrine, 
religious tenets or legal interpretation. Consequently, 
they can be satisfied only at the expense of the security 
of the adversary. 
Nevertheless, other, truly vital interests exist which 
are not necessarily contradictory; rather, they are mutual. 
It is the latter which must be recognized by the Israelis 
30 
and Palestinians (and by Israelis and Arabs generally) as 
having the potential to forge a common ground between them. 
The notion of common security, discussed in the next 
chapter, embodies precisely such mutual interests. 
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CHAPTER III 
COMMON SECURITY: ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN STYLE 
In the field of security we are slowly realizing that our 
understanding of security is too narrow in a double sense: 
First, it encompasses more than just military security, and 
second, it has to be more than just national security. 
--curt Gasteyger1 
. The achievement of s.ecuri ty, whether broadly defined as 
in the above quotation or confined strictly to military 
security, can no longer be viewed as a zero-sum process. As 
a case in point, consider the "security dilemma" which char-
acterized the East-West conflict prior to the institution of 
common security as the underlying philosophy of American-
Soviet detente. 
Simply put, the security dilemma describes a scenario 
whereby a state's efforts to enhance its security 
unilaterally initiate a chain of events which, in the end, 
diminishes its security. Specifically, it refers to a 
situation of intense rivalry in which even a defensive-
oriented action taken by side A (e.g., the deployment of 
anti-aircraft missiles) is typically perceived--or 
misperceived--as threatening by side B. This perceived 
provocation begets a "hostile" response by the latter 
34 
directed, at least ostensibly, at the former. Side A, in 
turn, retaliates against side B for its hostile act, and on 
it goes with each move progressively more detrimental to the 
security of the other. 
The security dilemma, then, is engendered by a tension-
laden atmosphere of common insecurity. This, in turn, can 
precipitate a dangerous and unending cycle of militarization 
in the form of an accelerating arms race, mutual distrust 
(perhaps accompanied and exacerbated by strategic 
deception), strong preemptive military imperatives and, 
ultimately, armed conflict. 
The United States and the former Soviet Union were able 
to overcome this common insecurity. They did so by the 
realization that even with an underlying nuclear deterrence 
regime of mutual assured destruction (MAD), there could be 
only common security for both or no real security for 
either. Hence, the transformation of East-West arms control 
negotiations from a zero-sum game into a positive-sum 
process reversed what was a dangerous, if not entirely 
predictable, trend and thereby contributed to the eventual 
termination of the Cold War. 2 
The concept of common security originated with the work 
of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security 
Issues, which was formed in Stockholm, Sweden in 1980. The 
commission developed the concept primarily as a proposed 
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alternative to the NATO-Warsaw Pact doctrine of mutual 
deterrence (nuclear and conventional). 3 This alternative, 
it has been seen, was adopted (with positive results) as the 
underlying philosophy governing East-West relations. a half-
decade later. 
While the Stockholm commission focused the bulk of its 
efforts on potential arms control strategies for the rival 
East-West blocs, it also stressed the applicability of the 
common security concept to Third World countries as well. 
In the view of the commission, these states, like the 
nuclear powers, "cannot achieve security against [i.e., at 
the expense of] their adversaries."4 This study concurs 
with the latter conclusion, particularly in its applica-
bility to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The goal of this chapter, therefore, is to establish 
the essential elements of a common security framework for 
Israel and the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. Such a framework, it is hoped, will help 
elucidate the requisites for a secure Israeli-Palestinian 
peace. First, however, it is necessary to provide a more 
detailed definition of the notion of common security. This 
will be followed by a brief enumeration of the variables 
which render the concept conducive to resolving this 
specific conflict. 
COMMON SECURITY DEFINED 
This study defines common security as a mutual 
commitment to joint survival. This commitment is based on a 
recognition that because of an increasingly interdependent 
world--militarily, politically, economically and 
demographically--states can no longer achieve security 
unilaterally but rather only through the creation of 
positive-sum processes which lead to cooperation with one 
another. Two important assumptions underlie this 
definition. First, the security of all states is itself 
interdependent, particularly given a broad definition of 
national security (see below). Second, military force, 
political intimidation and economic coercion are very 
unlikely to be effective instruments for settling 
international (or intercommunal) disputes over the long 
run. 5 
Principles 
To achieve the comprehensive common security defined 
above, the following principles, at a minimum, must be 
adhered to by the parties involved: 6 
1. All states have a legitimate right to security 
regardless of their political or ideological bent. 
36 
2. Policies and actions which strive for unilateral 
security advantages--whether by acquiring armaments, 
bargaining in negotiations for mutually exclusive gains 
or, most dangerously, exercising military force--should 
be discouraged. 
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3. Efforts to attain military superiority vis-a-vis 
adversaries should cease and be replaced by the pursuit 
of parity between the parties. Parity, however, must take into 
account such things as the parties' disparate geostrategic circumstances and 
disparities of human and material resources. Adversaries, for 
example, need not be required to have identical 
military force structures and levels. 
4. The adversarial relationship between the parties should 
gradually be replaced by a political atmosphere 
conducive to the normalization of peaceful relations. 
Of paramount importance is the need to establish 
bilateral links (e.g., political, economic) which will 
reinforce interdependence, thereby creating for both 
sides a vested interest in the durability of the 
settlement of the conflict. 
Several of the major attributes of the American-Soviet 
rivalry which made the common security alternative so 
suitable for helping to wind down the East-West conflict 
exist in some form in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship 
as well. First, the vital interests of the Israelis and the 
Palestinian Arabs of the territories, like those of the 
nuclear superpowers, are inextricably bound up with one 
another. Thus, immediate-term unilateral security gains by 
one side at the expense of the other are shortsighted and 
are likely to reduce security over the long run. Second, 
the Israeli-Palestinian rivalry is characterized by a great 
degree of animosity and distrust, even more deep-rooted than 
that which existed between the u.s. and former Soviet Union. 
Consequently, perceptions of one another's intentions play a 
significant role in the rivalry and must therefore be taken 
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into consideration in any proposed solution of the conflict. 
Third, there exists a ~c~roca/threat to each other's vital 
interests. In other words, each side is vulnerable in terms 
of the multiplicity of credible threats the other side poses 
to its national well-being. Neither the Israelis nor the 
Palestinians, therefore, can feel truly secure as long as 
either one remains a perceived threat to the other. 7 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict contains another 
significant variable, one which did not even exist in the 
superpower rivalry: the struggle is for possession of and 
sovereignty over the same geographic domain. Clearly, it is 
this unique factor, more than any other attribute of the 
rivalry, which renders the common security concept highly 
appropriate for resolving the conflict. 
What is National Security? 
The question here really is: What is meant by security 
in the notion of common security? Michael Klare and Daniel 
Thomas, Harold Brown, and Daniel Kaufman et al. all argue 
that security can no longer be viewed within the narrow 
confines of physical security alone (i.e., strong military 
defense against enemy invasion). 8 Rather, the concept of 
security must be expanded to include all major threats or 
perils to the national welfare whether they endanger 
national borders or a national territory, the national, 
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regional or global economy, a vital economic resource (e.g., 
water), intrasocietal stability and order, or a national 
culture. 
In its final report, the Independent Commission on 
Disarmament and Security Issues also offered an expanded 
definition of security: 
. Clearly, a secure nation9 is one. that is free from 
both the fact and the threat of military attack 
· and occupation, that preserves the health and 
safety of its citizens, and generally advances 
their economic well-being. There are also less 
tangible dimensions to security •.. all nations want 
to be able to remain true to the principles and 
ideals.upon which their country was founded, free 
to chart futures in a manner of their own 
choosing. 10 
The notion of common security, then, must be 
comprehensive for it to be instrumental in the formulation 
of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That is, 
in order to underpin a stable Israeli-Palestinian peace, 
this concept must be applied to the entire range of vital 
security interests of both peoples. 
What are these long-term security interests? The vital 
interests of the Israelis and the Palestinians, as they are 
defined in this study, are not at all dissimilar. More 
importantly, they are interdependent and thereby inextri-
cably linked to one another. It is therefore essential to 
keep in mind that although each side's security interests 
can be enumerated separately (below), they do not exist in 
a vacuum. 
Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians are totally 
unequivocal about their vital interests regarding the 
ultimate disposition of the Israeli-administered terri-
tories. On the one hand, significant segments of the 
Israeli population endorse the notion of a Greater Eretz Yisrael 
(i.e., pre-1967 Israel plus the West Bank and Gaza Strip). 
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On the other hand, the official PLO leadership has in the 
past been deliberately ambiguous about the fine line between 
an intifada to shake off the occupation and armed struggle 
to "liberate" all of Palestine, which includes Israel proper 
in addition to the territories. 
Most Israelis would agree, however, that their vital 
security interests would be served by the following: 
1) first and foremost, permanent borders which provide 
Israel with a margin of security to ensure its national 
survival and which are recognized by the international 
community, the Arab world in particular; 2) the perpetuation 
of Israel's Jewish character in conjunction with its 
existing democratic system of governance; 3) the mini-
mization of the risk of internecine Jewish strife, even 
violent civil war, engendered by deep societal cleavages; 
4) a level of economic growth which enables the country to 
allocate a sufficient share of its national resources to the 
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absorption of Jewish immigrants, education, health care, 
housing and other infrastructure, and capital investment in 
industry; and 5) a perpetually adequate supply of water, the 
Middle East's scarcest vital resource. 
The Palestinians, at a minimum, insist upon: 1) an 
affirmation by the international community of their right to 
, self-determination, whose only means of fulfillment is the 
creation of a sovereign political entity in what they 
consider to be Palestinian territory now controlled by 
Israel; 2) security against external military threats, 
including those from other Arab states; 3) the minimization 
of the prospects for internal social upheaval within what 
has for decades been a fragmented Palestinian Arab community 
(i.e., internal stability); 4) economic viability, enabling 
them to build adequate infrastructure, invest in modern 
industrial plant and resettle, feed, house and educate the 
hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees presently 
dispersed throughout the Arab world who would wish to reside 
in their homeland; and 5) a sufficient long-term supply of 
water for industry, irrigation and household use. 
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MILITARY SECURITY V. SELF-DETERMINATION 
No resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is 
conceivable-unless, first and foremost, it is perceived by 
the Israelis as safeguarding their military (physical) 
security while at the same time satisfying the Palestinians' 
demand for political self-determination. Of course, the 
ultimate question posed by many Arab-Israeli scholars is 
whether these two requisites for a settlement are compatible 
(positive interdependence) or mutually exclusive (zero-sum in 
nature). 
Perhaps no other country in the world is as obsessed 
with its physical security--indeed its national survival--as 
the state of Israel. Seen by its Arab neighbors as the last 
vestige of insufferable Western imperialism and having 
endured a history of war, terrorism and intermittent 
international isolation, Israel has had no other choice but 
to orient an unusually large portion of its foreign policy 
and resources (human as well as material) toward military 
security. 
This fixation on national defense has stemmed from two 
factors in particular: the enormous disparity of resources 
between Israel and its Arab enemies and, at least until June 
1967, the former's highly exposed geostrategic position. 
Underlying the latter of these two problems are Israel's 
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small size, vulnerable geographic configuration and, most 
importantly, over-concentration of its Jewish population and 
industry in relatively minute, well-defined territorial 
pockets. Specifically, two-thirds of its population and 
eighty percent of its industry are located along the Sharon, 
a narrow coastal plain whose maximum width is a mere sixteen 
miles! 
Even so, the Israelis' perception of vulnerability 
seemed to have been alleviated by the primary outcome of the 
1967 Six-Day War--the·appendage of the conquered Arab 
territories. The addition of the West Bank and Golan, for 
example, gave Israel the sense that it had gained sufficient 
strategic depth to enable it to contain an Arab·armored 
invasion from the east and sufficient warning time to permit 
it to defend against a surprise Arab attack by air. 11 
Israeli military strategists believe that, even with 
today•s widespread ballistic missile technology, the 
dominant form of warfare which determines political outcomes is 
still the movement of conventional land armies. Thus, the 
strategic importance of the territories has not, in their 
view, diminished. 12 This is so despite Israel's nuclear 
arsenal, presently estimated at over 200 warheads. 13 Louis 
Beres and Yohanan Ramati argue, for example, that over the 
long run, Israel's nuclear arsenal cannot continue to serve 
as an effective deterrent against a full-scale conventional 
invasion by Arab land forces. 14 Indeed, Syria, it is 
reasonable to assume, has already developed a potential 
counter-deterrent to an Israeli nuclear attack by means of 
its highly destructive chemical weapons capability. 
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Significantly, Israel has now officially endorsed the 
concept of a future nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. 15 
This change in outlook undoubtedly stems from an awareness 
that a mutual assured destruction (MAD) regime among Israel 
and any future Arab nuclear states would likely not be 
feasible. That is, Israel's small size and over-
concentrated Jewish population would substantially undermine 
the credibility of a retaliatory second strike capacity. 
Clearly, the corollary is that the topographical advantages 
and strategic depth afforded by the West Bank (and the 
Golan) are indispensable to Israel as defensive military 
assets. 
Opposite this position that Israel requires the 
territories for military security is what Matti Steinberg 
refers to as "the centrality of the territorial principle in 
the definition of Palestinian identity. 1116 Palestinians 
distinguish themselves from other Arabs solely by their 
territorial connection to the land they call Palestine--the 
area encompassing not merely the West Bank and Gaza strip 
but Israel proper as well. This definition of identity is 
clearly stated in article 5 of the 1968 Palestinian National 
Covenant, which reads: "The Palestinians are those Arab 
nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine 
regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have 
[sic] stayed there. 1117 
Particularly problematic for the Israelis is the 
concomitant desire of the Palestinians to translate their 
distinct identity into sovereignty and political inde-
pendence. The territorial imperative in the Palestinian 
conception of political self-determination is well-
entrenched and non-negotiable. It is thus difficult to 
envisage a scenario whereby Israel could retain the West 
Bank and Gaza without denying the Palestinians the very 
essence of their national existence. 
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Israeli decision-makers might encounter great 
difficulty reaching a consensus regarding which parts of the 
West Bank and Gaza, if any, they could (or could not) afford 
to relinquish for the sake of an independent or autonomous 
Palestinian homeland. Clearly, the fundamental question 
which they would ultimately have to confront is: Does 
retention of this specific territory truly enhance Israel's 
security, if, at the same time, it fuels the Palestinian 
perception that their long-term prospects for self-
determination (indeed, national survival) are being 
irreparably undermined? 
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As has been seen, the importance of the West Bank, and, 
to a lesser extent, the Gaza Strip for Israel's defense can 
in no way be dismissed. Yet, one must consider whether the 
security risks posed by additional territory are not greater 
than the benefits they accord given the existing, poten-
tially explosive circumstances in those areas and in the 
Arab world at large. 
There is no clear-cut answer to this question; in fact, 
the same factor may have contradictory implications. On the 
one hand, Israel's possession of the West Bank enhances its 
tactical position by giving it a formidable security barrier 
to help deter an Arab assault on its eastern front. The 
West Bank also serves as a local base from which Israel can 
effectively counter Palestinian terrorist operations. On 
the other hand, it is Israel's very retention of former Arab 
territory which increases the Arab states' collective 
incentive to make war against the Jewish state. More 
importantly, continued Israeli rule is certain to inflame 
and radicalize further an indigenous Palestinian population 
which demands self-determination and is already being pushed 
to its limit by a widespread perception that the occupation 
is becoming more and more oppressive. In this context, the 
territories ostensibly improve Israel's margin of security 
while at the same time increasing the probability of war and 
instability over the long run! 
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The notion of common security would seem to dictate the 
need to search for a realistic alternative whereby Israel 
would at least retain the security advantages provided by 
the West Bank even were this territory to become a sovereign Palestinian political 
entity. Such an alternative could translate into Israel 
annexing some of the strategically important parts of the 
West Bank (and possibly Gaza) and returning the rest to Arab 
control. Another option would be for Israel to establish 
security arrangements--perhaps jointly with the 
Palestinians--in designated areas of the territory to be 
evacuated. In the latter scenario, Israel would relinquish 
sovereign control of the territories to the Palestinians, 
thus acceding to their demand for political self-
determination. However, due to the nature of demilitari-
zation schemes and multinational force deployments--if not 
an actual Israeli extraterritorial military presence--such 
sovereignty would of necessity be limited. These and other 
scenarios are evaluated in more detail in the concluding 
chapters of this study. 
SUPPORT FOR A SETTLEMENT AND INTERNAL STABILITY 
The concept of common security attempts to address the 
adversaries' mutual obsession with one another's intentions 
engendered by a deep-rooted distrust between long-time 
enemies. In the negotiating process, each side naturally 
raises doubts about the willingness (or ability) of the 
other to abide by the prospective terms of a permanent 
settlement. It is in the interests of both, therefore, to 
ensure that the outcome of the negotiations will be an 
agreement which will prove acceptable to the vast majority 
of their respective populations. 
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For one thing, neither side is likely to ratify a peace 
treaty knowing that a sizable or highly influential sector 
of the adversary's population refuses to support the 
settlement. More importantly, once an agreement has been 
implemented, excessive concern with merely the intentions of 
those on the other side who openly aim to sabotage the 
settlement could lead the threatened party to respond 
preemptively by military means. The two sides thus could 
easily find themselves back in the throes of the very 
security dilemma which they sought to resolve. 
There is a related, potentially more serious dimension 
of this aspect of security. Specifically, neither the 
Israelis nor the Palestinians can feel secure unless both 
societies enjoy internal stability. Internal desta-
bilization not only threatens the state or society in which 
it occurs, it commonly threatens neighboring societies as 
well (i.e., it undermines regional stability). It is 
critical, therefore, that the concessions which will 
inevitably be made by each side to achieve a political 
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settlement not deepen existing societal cleavages over the 
question of the final disposition of the West Bank and Gaza. 
Any further exacerbation of the internal tensions which are 
presently a salient feature of both societies could 
ultimately lead to civil war, thereby threatening the 
stability of the entire area. 
It is not beyond the realm of possibility, for example, 
that an Arab Palestine in the West Bank and Gaza could 
become another Lebanon, totally paralyzed by sectarian 
violence and anarchy. Presumably, a sovereign Palestine 
would be governed by the PLO, yet the latter is by no means 
a monolithic organization. The divisions within that body, 
though papered over at times, are many and serious. A 
permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinians 
might prove unacceptable to the radical rejectionist 
elements within the PLO. These factions could then secede 
from the organization and attempt to undermine the agreement 
by means of terrorist operations inside Israel or within the 
borders of the incipient Palestinian entity. 
There exists, moreover, several Palestinian groups 
operating outside the PLO umbrella which oppose in principle 
not only the mainstream Fatah wing of the organization, but, 
from time to time, its radical secular factions as well. 
These include Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, the Islamic 
fundamentalist groups which openly call for a holy war to 
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eradicate the Jewish presence from all of Palestine. It is 
not inconceivable, therefore, that Palestinian political 
self-determination could gradually be subverted by violent 
internecine war between moderate and radical secular blocs, 
between secular and fundamentalist blocs, or both. 18 From 
Israel's point of view, its security would clearly be 
adversely affected if it were forced to contend with a 
second "hot" border. 
In Israel, too, a political settlement involving 
territorial compromise could trigger widespread violent 
opposition, particularly among (but not limited to) the 
settler community. One scholar describes in detail what 
such a crisis would potentially entail: 
••• repeated demonstrations by hundreds of 
thousands of Jews, violence against both Jews and 
·Arabs, challenges to the authority and legitimacy 
of the government, a host of rabbinical decrees 
opposing the government's intentions [regarding 
territorial withdrawal], the creation of scores of 
new illegal settlements, threats of civil war, a 
sudden influx of militantly ultranationalist 
Diaspora Jews and ... attempts at spectacular 
actions such as the destruction of the Muslim 
shrines in Jerusalem. 19 
While the above scenario may be somewhat overstated, 
there is no denying that Israel is deeply divided over key 
territorial and ideological issues. Thus, the threat of 
civil war cannot be dismissed. Not only would this threat 
clearly imperil the security of Israel, it would, moreover, 
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endanger the security of the incipient Palestinian entity 
established in territory which was being evacuated (this 
assumes, of course, that implementation of the settlement 
could progress to the withdrawal stage in the first place). 
Of particular concern to the Palestinians is the likelihood 
that a Jewish civil war, were it to occur, would be centered 
in the West Bank with the violence quickly spreading to the 
densely populated Arab enclaves. 
The concept of common security, then, requires that the 
terms of Israeli-Palestinian coexistence be supported on 
each side by a strong majority whose interests in a secure 
peace are firmly entrenched. Such permanent interests, 
moreover, must move these majorities to neutralize quickly 
the threat of dissenting factions who strive to sabotage the 
settlement. Otherwise, internal discord and the resultant 
destabilization (within either society) is likely to under-
mine the security of both the Israelis and the Palestinians. 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC THREAT 
Common security, it has been seen, operates on the 
basis of a recognition among the adversaries that neither of 
them can unilaterally achieve security at the expense of the 
other. This is because the adversarial relationship is 
characterized by mutual threat and inextricably linked vital 
interests. There exists a fundamental and unique sense in 
which this notion holds true for the Israelis, the 
overwhelming majority of whom would regard their state's 
Jewish character and democratic form of government as 
indispensable elements of security. 
Even if it could be proven that the appendage of the 
territories provides Israel with a greater degree of 
military {and psychological) security, their continued 
retention is problematic. Specifically, it forces the 
Israelis to confront a fundamental dilemma concerning the 
ultimate nature of their.country: Is it to be Jewish and 
democratic? Jewish (at least in terms of the majority of 
its citizenry) but no longer democratic? Or democratic but 
no longer Jewish? 
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The only way for Israel to annex the West Bank and Gaza 
outright and remain a democracy would seem to be by 
eventually forfeiting its Jewish character. Specifically, a 
democratic state in all of Eretz Israel would entail 
granting the Palestinian inhabitants of the territories full 
political rights, including citizenship and the concomitant 
right to vote. Because of their much higher birth rates, 
Arab citizens of a Greater Israel would likely outnumber 
Israeli Jews before the middle of the next century. 20 
The late Rabbi Meir Kahane, a right-wing extremist, 
warned of the potential implications of precisely such a 
"free" Arab majority in Israel: 
Does "free" mean an equal right for an Arab 
majority in the Knesset [the Israeli parliament] to 
decide that the state be named "Palestine?" That 
the Law of Return, which today allows Jews, not 
Arabs, automatic entrance and citizenship, be 
canceled? In short, could the Arabs of the Jewish 
state •.• be free and equal to ... democratically 
bring an end to Zionism and to the Jewish state?21 
Arguably, there is no other way in which the Palestinians pose a more serious 
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potential threat to Israel than they do in regard to its Jewish and, indirectly, democratic 
nature. Will the Palestinian question eventually force Israel 
to make this choice between its Jewishness and its 
democratic system of government? Not necessarily. But 
under a framework of common security, Israel clearly cannot 
remain a Jewish and democratic state if it attempts to do so 
at the expense of Palestinian political self-determination. 
COMMON ECONOMIC SECURITY 
In today's world, the concept of security must include 
protection against threats to the economic well-being of a 
state or society. Indeed, the national security of a state 
on the verge of economic collapse (e.g., Russia) might be 
more endangered than if it were threatened by military 
invasion. Still, an expanded definition of security is not 
in itself sufficient reason for economic security22 to be included 
under the umbrella of common security. Other variables must 
also be present, as they are in this specific conflict. 
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For the Israelis and Palestinians, the envisioned 
common security framework must take into account economic 
threats. There are four major reasons for this in addition 
to the expanded definition rationale: 1) the continuation 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict clearly threatens bo~ 
sides' economic well-being; 2) the Israeli and Palestinian 
economies are interdependent, albeit on an uneven basis; 
3) profound economic instability within one society, 
particularly a new sovereign Palestinian entity, could have 
an inimical effect on the physical security of the other; 
and 4) the creation of a common economic market among Israel 
and the Palestinians--as well as the neighboring Arab 
states--would be generally beneficial to all parties. 
Costs of the Conflict 
The most detrimental economic cost of the ongoing 
Israeli-Palestinian (and Arab-Israeli) conflict is the 
distortion of the social and economic structures of the 
adversaries. This enormous opportunity cost, along with the 
inevitable direct costs of the conflict (below), is a 
primary contributor to economic stagnation. For both sides, 
a continuation of the struggle means that, contrary to the 
notion of common economic security, there are less resources 
available for those things which foster economic 
development: education, housing, capital investment in 
industry and infrastructure, and technological innovation. 
Consequently, Israel, the Palestinians and Israel's Arab 
neighbors will continue to be economically--and thereby 
politically--dependent on outside powers and resources. 
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The Palestinian intifada against the Israeli occupation 
provides the most salient evidence of how the conflict poses 
a danger to the economic welfare of both sides. During its 
first eighteen months in particular, the intifada produced 
considerable economic repercussions in Israel. 23 In June 
1989, Israeli Finance Minister Shimon Peres (now the foreign 
minister) estimated that the uprising had already cost 
Israel, directly and indirectly, between $2.25 and $3 
billion. 24 In 1988, which witnessed the peak of the 
intifada, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) deployed an 
average of 10,000 soldiers per day in the territories at a 
cost of $225 million. 25 Furthermore, mandatory reserve duty 
during that year doubled to an average of fifty days per 
man. 26 This unusually large mobilization of reservists, 
normally a wartime measure required by Israel due to its 
relatively small population, caused a sharp and widespread 
decline in production. Hardest hit were the labor-intensive 
sectors of the Israeli economy, such as construction, 
agriculture and textiles (these sectors were also hurt by 
Palestinian worker absenteeism due to strikes and military 
curfews) • 27 
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Two other areas which were adversely affected by the 
intifada in its peak year were Israeli exports to the West 
Bank and Gaza and tourism. Sales of Israeli industrial 
goods to the territories fell in 1988 by $600 million, or 
seventy percent28 ; the sale of agricultural goods fell by 
sixty percent. 29 This precipitous decline in exports to the 
territories was primarily the result of a Palestinian 
boycott imposed on Israeli commodities for which a local 
substitute existed. Revenue from tourism, which Israel 
depends on as a major source of foreign currency income, 
decreased by $120 million (approximately fifteen percent) as 
tourists stayed away from what was perceived to be an unsafe 
region. 3° Consequently, Israel, already saddled with a 
burdensome foreign debt, was forced to borrow even more from 
external sources. 
Although the magnitude of the costs suffered by the 
Israeli economy due to the intifada lessened after mid-
1989,31 it would surely increase again if a renewed uprising 
were to recapture or surpass the intensity level it 
possessed in its first two years. It is readily apparent 
that if the current Israeli-Palestinian bilateral 
negotiations do not continue to yield concrete political 
gains for the Palestinians, they will become further 
frustrated and radicalized. Having failed in the diplomatic 
arena, they are likely to sense that they have nothing to 
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lose by resorting to increasingly widespread violent 
resistance against the occupation. Were such a development 
to occur, the economic costs to Israel would clearly be 
substantial. 
The Palestinians, too, have suffered economically as a 
result of the conflict. By the middle of the intifada's 
second year, the disruption of economic activity in the 
territories caused in large part by Israeli-imposed economic 
pressures, 32 intermittent strikes, vandalism against strike 
violators and self-imposed boycotts resulted in a severe 
economic crisis. Private income fell sharply. The ensuing 
decline in private consumption forced many Arab shopowners, 
particularly in East Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem, out 
of business, and a situation of economic scarcity developed 
throughout the territories. This, in turn, led to a 
noticeable reduction in the Palestinian standard of living, 
by as much as 35 percent in some sectors. 33 The inevitable 
conclusion drawn by this study is that if the Palestinians 
choose eventually to renew--and escalate--their uprising 
against the Israelis, they can do so only by inflicting 
considerable economic damage on themselves. 
Interdependence 
According to one definition, economic interdependence 
"is present when there is an increased national sensitivity 
[actual or perceived] to external economic developments."~ 
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In a general sense, then, increasing economic interde-
pendence means that there are more and more ways by which 
external forces and actors, like those of a neighboring 
state, may affect national economic conditions. 
Theoretically, the greater the degree of interdependence 
between the economies of two societies, the higher the 
probability that the poor performance of one will negatively 
influence the performance of the other. Interdependence 
theory, therefore, is compatible with the concept of common 
economic security: neither side can enjoy a high level of 
economic security unless both do. 
To be sure, Israel relies on the territories as a 
captive export market (sixteen percent of total Israeli 
exports in 1987, prior to the outbreak of the intifada35 ) 
and a source of cheap labor for the labor-intensive sectors 
of its economy (forty percent of the Palestinian work force 
in 1987~). Thus, a significant drop in Palestinian private 
consumption due to recession, for example, could hurt 
Israeli exporters of elastic goods, such as plastics, wood 
products, cement and electric power. Nevertheless, Israel's 
dependence on the economy of the territories pales in 
comparison to Palestinian economic dependence on Israel. 
Ties to Israel, moreover, are currently as large a 
proportion as ever of the total Palestinian economy, civil 
resistance in the territories notwithstanding. 37 
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Much of the Palestinian economic dependence on Israel 
has been the result of a deliberate Israeli strategy to make 
the economy of the territories, particularly the agri-
cultural sector, fit into the Israeli economy. Israel 
dominates Palestinian trade flows by providing almost all 
imports into the territories (including industrial raw 
materials and manufacturing components without which they 
could not survive economically) and by purchasing eighty 
percent of their exports.~ Furthermore, employment in 
Israel continues to be the main source of income for both 
the West Bank and Gaza. 39 Consequently, fluctuations in the 
performance of the Israeli economy have an immediate impact 
upon the health of the Palestinian sector. 
Between 1981 and 1985, for example, with Israel's 
economy in deep recession and the inflation rate reaching 
triple digits, the West Bank and Gaza entered into a period 
of severe economic stagnation. Nearly all of the Arab 
inhabitants of the territories suffered. The Palestinian 
agriculture growth rate plummeted as productivity fell 
sharply. Palestinian consumers were hit with price 
increases of as much as 500 percent. Those who worked in 
Israel (in 1984, 32.5 and 46 percent of the West Bank and 
Gazan labor forces, respectively) saw their earlier benefits 
of increased incomes completely eroded by Israel's currency 
devaluations and high inflation. 40 
Other external factors, which underlay Palestinian 
economic dependence on certain Arab states in addition to 
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Israel, exacerbated this misery. For example, falling oil 
prices and the 1984 recession in the Arab countries 
curtailed the abundant employment opportunities abroad for 
Palestinian university graduates, thus contributing to 
increasing unemployment locally. The slowdown in the 
Jordanian economy, which in the early 1980's purchased 
nearly half of all Palestinian exports, significantly 
reduced the demand for agricultural goods from the 
territories. 41 Though specific circumstances may have 
changed since this period, the overall situation is 
unchanged today: the Palestinians cannot achieve a 
sufficient level of economic security unless the economy of 
Israel and of the region in general are healthy. This will 
hold true even if the Palestinians attain political self-
determination. 
Economic Instability 
Economic insecurity within a new sovereign Palestinian 
entity could translate into physical insecurity for the 
Israelis. In other words, it is in Israel's best interests 
to promote to the extent possible not only its own economic 
growth, but the development of the Palestinian economy as 
well. For one thing, an economy plagued by high unem-
ployment and a sharply decreasing standard of living can 
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lead to internal social and political upheaval, the precise 
sort of environment in which militant, anti-Western Islamic 
fundamentalism seems to thrive. Such civil strife and 
religious extremism, in turn, often pose a threat to the 
security of the immediate region and beyond (see also, 
Support for a Settlement and Internal Stability, above). 
Furthermore, as Mark Heller notes, one major obstacle 
to a Palestinian entity's "capacity to sustain a 
nonbelligerent posture may be economic."~ A self-governing 
Palestinian authority unable ·to satisfy the economic needs 
of the inhabitants of the territories might feel compelled 
to renew or condone terrorist activity against Israel, 
attempting either to divert domestic discontent or acquire 
some economic advantage (e.g., water or cultivatable land). 
To be sure, profound destabilization within the Israeli 
economy could, in a similar way, ultimately threaten the 
vital security interests of the Palestinians. This would be 
particularly true if a right-wing nationalist party, like 
the Likud, were in power. Nevertheless, the greater concern 
here is with the threat -of Palestinian economic instability 
because of the numerous economic challenges the Palestinians 
would face upon achieving political self-determination in 
whatever form. Among the most serious difficulties would 
be: 1) the scarcity of natural resources, including 
domestic energy sources, in the West Bank and Gaza; 2) the 
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restricted nature of the Palestinian domestic market; 3) a 
high rate of natural increase among the Arab population of 
the territories and the resultant strain on resources and 
infrastructure; 4) a limited capacity to absorb refugees who 
would immigrate to the Palestinian homeland; and 5) likely 
continued economic dependence on Israel. 
Common Economic Market 
Clearly, a common security framework among the Israelis 
and Palestinians must include economic security. In 
addition, it should do so in a manner that creates for both 
sides a vested interest in peace, which, in turn, would be 
one of its primary reinforcement mechanisms. Perhaps the 
surest way to establish such a permanent mutual interest in 
the durability of a political solution is through the 
creation of a common economic market, initially among 
Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and possibly Jordan. Later, 
the market could be expanded to include the rest of the 
Levant--Egypt, Lebanon and Syria. 
Admittedly, a political settlement is likely to have a 
negative impact on certain sectors within the economies of 
the area (e.g., those related to present military 
consumption). Nevertheless, the long-term benefits of peace 
and economic cooperation should outweigh the short-term 
costs of the post-settlement structural transition which 
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these economies would have to make. The socio-economic 
advantages of a common market include: 43 
1. The creation of economies of scale, which the countries 
of the Levant (except Egypt) currently lack due to 
their relative smallness in terms of population, size 
of markets and purchasing power. 
2. The complementarity of production inputs from diverse 
partners, including labor, technology and marketing 
infrastructure. The combining of these inputs would 
a) enable the local economies to perform advanced 
processing of resources presently exported as raw 
materials (and thereby extract the value added) ; b) 
enhance the ability of these economies to compete 
effectively in international markets. 
3. The maximization of income throughout the region. 
Well-established economic theory and empirical 
observation have established that, in general, income 
is maximized by free trade and the free flow of capital 
and labor. 
4. The attraction of foreign investment. Because regional 
economic cooperation both reflects a commitment to and 
reinforces the permanence of the conflict's settlement, 
a common market approach would foster regional 
stability and thereby help attract needed foreign 
private capital. 
5. The stimulation of joint ventures, many of which would 
be directed at resolving serious region-wide problems. 
Potential areas of cooperation include desalination, 
water conveyance and irrigation, energy, the 
environment, transportation, communications and 
tourism. 
Patrick Clawson notes that such benefits are greatest 
when the economies of the.partners are strong in divergent 
spheres. Because they are so dissimilar, the Israeli, 
Palestinian and Jordanian economies in particular could 
profit substantially from the creation of a common market. 44 
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Most importantly, with today•s. global trend of forming 
common markets (e.g., the European Community, North America 
and Southeast Asia), it would seem that the region's only 
means of competing successfully in international markets is 
through advanced economic cooperation. 
COMMON WATER SECURITY 
Under the domain of economic security must be included 
what this study refers to as common water security: a 
replenishable supply of water sufficient to meet the 
industrial, agricultural and household needs of both sides. 
Water is the Middle East's scarcest vital resource; indeed, 
Jordan's King Hussein recently predicted that the region's 
next war would emanate from a dispute over water.~ Because 
of its importance, therefore, water will be discussed 
separately here. 
The requirement that an Israeli-Palestinian and wider 
Arab-Israeli common security framework take into account 
water security stems from a dangerous combination of 
factors: 1) the overexploitation and resultant acute 
shortage of the area's limited water resources, almost all 
of which reside in two or more national territories; 2) run-
away population growth, particularly among the Arabs; 3) an 
almost total lack of cooperation between the disputants (and 
between the Arab states themselves) regarding the sharing of 
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water resources; and 4) with specific regard to the Israelis 
and Palestinians, absolute Israeli control over the usage of 
water whose source is the large subterranean aquifers wholly 
or partially located in the West Bank. 
At present, water demand in the area encompassing 
Israel, the territories and Jordan exceeds supply by 20-50 
percent.~ According to projections based on current 
demographic and economic trends, Israel alone could face an 
annual water deficit of as much as 800 million cubic meters 
(mcm) by the end of the decade. 47 Moreover, once the 
population of the region currently fed by those water 
resources between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River 
reaches fifteen million 20-30 years from now, supply will be 
sufficient for drinking water only. That is, in Israel, 
Jordan, the territories and southern Syria, there will be no 
fresh water for agriculture from these sources. 48 
With insufficient water in the area to meet the needs 
of both the Israelis and Palestinians, the situation is 
clearly untenable over the long run and may already be so 
for the Arab inhabitants of the territories. This is 
because the Israelis, including the Jewish settlers in the 
West Bank and Gaza, receive an enormously disproportionate 
share of the total water resources under Israeli control 
(over three times more than the Palestinians on a per capita 
basis). 49 Israeli overexploitation of West Bank and Gazan 
water resources in particular has produced a general 
lowering of the water table. 
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The over-pumping of wells in Jewish settlements not 
only has severely depleted the amount of water available to 
the Palestinian population in some locations, it has also 
noticeably reduced the quality of the water in general. As 
long as the over-pumping continues, salt-water seepage into 
groundwater sources will increase, eventually rendering the 
water irreversibly unusable for most purposes. In fact, 
Palestinian agriculture has in some cases already suffered 
significant losses as ·a result of Jewish overexploitation. 50 
Despite Israel's control of the water resources, the 
Israelis will not enjoy water security as long as they 
continue to deny it to the Palestinians. For one thing, the 
Palestinians will become increasingly embittered and hostile 
if the situation is permitted to worsen much further. 
Second, the more the Israelis neglect Palestinian 
agricultural water needs, the heavier the losses this 
critical sector of the territorie~' economy will inevitably 
suffer. The resultant decline in income and increase in 
unemployment, particularly in the depressed rural areas, 
will contribute to more economic instability and the further 
radicalization of an already frustrated population. 
(Similarly, the Palestinians cannot expect to attain water 
security at the expense of Israel. Because Israeli 
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agriculture in the densely populated costal plain is highly 
dependent on the West Bank aquifers, Israel is unlikely to 
tolerate a future scenario in which a sovereign or 
autonomous Palestinian authority refuses to share water 
resources.) 
The long-term solution to the region's acute water 
shortage requires bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
among Israel, the Palestinians and Israel's Arab neighbors. 
That is, only through compromise and cooperation will the 
disputants be able to resolve the problem of having to 
allocate equitably a scarce vital resource to different 
political entities, each claiming exclusive control over the 
usage of that resource. Ultimately, the parties will have 
to implement a comprehensive regional water regime which 
likely would institute the import of unutilized water 
resources (e.g., those in Lebanon and Turkey), joint 
irrigation networks, joint desalination facilities and 
mandatory recycling of urban water. Cooperation in the 
allocation of water would create an immensely important 
stake in an Arab-Israeli common security framework, which, 
in turn, would be one of its principal safeguards. 51 
To summarize, this chapter has attempted to demonstrate 
that a future Israeli-Palestinian political settlement will 
have to institute a comprehensive notion of common security 
as its underlying conceptual framework. In other words, any 
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proposed solution of the conflict should be evaluated by the 
degree to which it incorporates the following elements: 
1. A degree of physical security sufficient to ensure the 
national well-being of both sides. For Israel in 
particular, this means permanent borders which provide 
an ample margin of strategic depth and which are 
recognized by the Palestinians and the neighboring Arab 
states. 
2. Palestinian political self-determination consisting of 
some form of sovereign control over territory now 
controlled by Israel. 
3. Acceptance of the settlement by a strong majority on 
both sides, each with firmly entrenched interests in 
the durability of peace and normalization. Of 
particular importance is the need to ensure that the 
settlement does not seriously exacerbate existing 
societal divisions over the question of the final 
disposition of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
4. The retention of both Israel's Jewish character and 
democratic system of governance. 
5. Common economic security, enabling the Israeli and 
Palestinian economies to avert the direct and indirect 
costs of the conflict and shift resources to those 
things which promote mutual economic development. Over 
the long run, economic growth can be maximized by the 
creation of a common market among the former 
adversaries. 
6. A permanent supply of water sufficient to meet the 
industrial, irrigation and household needs of both 
sides. 
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CHAPTER IV 
NON-SETTLEMENT AND THE JORDANIAN OPTION 
With respect to the general consequences of the status quo, 
the fundamental point to be stressed is that it is 
incompatible with peace. 
--Mark A. Heller1 
In the first half of this study, the objective was to 
develop a viable conceptual framework for evaluating the 
alternatives regarding the ultimate disposition of the 
Israeli-administered West Bank and Gaza Strip. The frame-
work detailed in Chapter 3 centers on a comprehensive notion 
of Israeli-Palestinian common security encompassing military 
defense, internal (and regional) stability, economic 
viability and water security, Palestinian political self-
determination and the preservation of Israel's Jewish and 
democratic ideals. The second half of this paper will focus 
on the actual evaluation of various alternative scenarios, 
beginning in this chapter with: 1) the continuation of the 
present status quo; and 2) a return to the status quo ante 
June 5, 1967. 
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NON-SETTLEMENT 
Despite the groundbreaking changes anticipated from the 
September 1993 Gaza-Jericho autonomy accord, one basic fact 
remains: The Palestinians still will not have control over 
land, water, the Jewish settlements and external security. 
These critical areas excluded from Palestinian authority 
raise the specter of normalization of the status quo--i.e., 
continued virtual Israeli sovereignty over the territories. 
The perpetuation of the status quo in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, under any guise, is fundamentally untenable for 
both sides of the conflict. With the criteria set forth in 
Chapter 3 as the basis of evaluation, it can be readily 
demonstrated that the status quo--what is tantamount to non-
settlement--is incompatible with the notion of Israeli-
Palestinian common security. 
Military Security v. Self-Determination 
When viewed within the narrow confines of Israel's 
military security alone, some scholars note that the 
perpetuation of the status quo affords advantages which 
diminish the incentive of the Israelis to consider seriously 
other alternatives. Raphael Israeli, for example, contends 
that "Israel in control of the Territories has enjoyed much 
more security, both physical and psychological, than ever 
before .•• This consideration is particularly decisive for the 
West Bank, which lies immediately east of the [narrow] 
coastal plain of Israel."2 
76 
Louis Rene Beres takes this argument one step further 
by suggesting that a change in the territorial status quo 
would, in effect, increase the collective incentive of the 
Arabs to initiate a war against Israel: "Recognizing an 
improved configuration of forces vis-a-vis Israel [without 
the West Bank and Gaza], a large number of Arab states would 
undoubtedly calculate that they now confront a smaller, more 
beleaguered adversary."3 Thus, Beres assumes that even with 
a resolution of the Palestinian question, Arab hostility 
toward Israel will not cease. 
To be sure, the geostrategic value of the territories 
as an Israeli security asset is considerable (see Chapter 
3). The weakness of the above assertions, however, lies in 
their failure to assess this overall strategic value within 
a more comprehensive national security context which takes 
into consideration the existing realities in the territories 
and the Arab world at large. 
Arguments like those of Israeli and Beres which portray 
the West Bank and, to a lesser extent, the Gaza as 
indispensable territorial security buffers would sound 
rather convincing if these lands were unpopulated. But an 
objective analysis cannot simply detach Israel's 
geostrategic position from the security risk posed by the 
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1.9 million Palestinian Arab inhabitants of the territories, 
who are now more actively opposed to living under Israeli 
rule than ever. Simply put, Israel cannot rely on the 
territories for military security while simultaneously 
denying political self-determination to a hostile population 
which is becoming increasingly frustrated and radicalized. 
Beres's argument that a change in the territorial 
status quo increases the risk of another Arab-Israeli war is 
particularly troublesome. As evidence that "the bellig-
erence of the Arab states has nothing to do with the 
Palestinians (emphasis added]," he cites the Iraqi Scud 
missile attacks on Israel during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. 4 
The fact is, however, no Arab state, including Egypt, can or 
will acquiesce to Israel's permanent retention of the 
entirety of the West Bank and Gaza and the continued 
repression of Palestinian self-determination. True, Arab 
belligerence toward the Jewish state does not emanate merely 
from the Palestinian question, as evidenced by the Arab 
states' incessantly hostile military and political behavior 
toward Israel prior to its acquisition of the territories. 
Nevertheless, a change in the territorial status quo remains 
the lowest common denominator of the Arab consensus 
(inasmuch as such a consensus exists). 
Israeli control of lands regarded as indisputably 
Arab serves as a constant ideological-political prod to 
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collective Arab action. In effect, it provides the Arab 
states with a strong inducement to eventually make war 
against Israel once the military balance vis-a-vis the 
latter is perceived by them as favorable. Thus, while total 
or near-total Israeli withdrawal may not be a sufficient 
condition for a secure Arab-Israeli peace, it is a necessary 
one. Together, the two major security risks to Israel--one 
posed by the Arab states collectively, the other by the 
Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza--would seem 
to indicate that the potential costs of the status quo 
outweigh the benefits it accords. 
Implications of the Status Quo for Internal Stability 
The intifada has made it quite clear that continued 
Israeli subjugation of the Palestinians against their will 
can only serve as a destabilizing influence within the Arab 
communities of the West Bank and Gaza. Without question, 
the social and political unrest in the territories will 
persist (and likely intensify) unless the Palestinians 
achieve full self-determination on the basis of the 
territorial imperative discussed in Chapter 3. 
What effect does the status quo have on Israeli 
internal stability? Raphael Israeli argues that in light of 
the deep divisions within Israeli society over the question 
of the West Bank and Gaza, it might be "expedient" to 
maintain the status quo and postpone as long as possible any 
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decisions concerning the final disposition of the 
territories. 5 This position, however, is rather dubious and 
shortsighted. The point here is that societal cleavages do 
exist in Israel; thus, internal stability is already 
precarious. While the maintenance of the status quo may not 
seriously exacerbate those cleavages over the short run, it 
clearly does nothing to promote internal cohesion. More-
over, given what are likely ·to be the increasing military, 
political, economic and moral costs to Israel of non-
settlement, there are no guarantees that the status quo will 
not ultimately deepen existing societal divisions. 
A related question for Israel is the impact of the 
status quo on its Jewish and democratic nature. At best, 
Israel's present no-withdrawal-no-annexation position 
permits it to avoid indefinitely the fundamental dilemma 
regarding the sort of state it will ultimately be: Jewish 
and democratic, democratic and binational, or Jewish and 
authoritarian? More pessimistically, the status quo, while 
ostensibly allowing the Israelis to sweep this problem under 
the rug, will slowly continue to erode Israel's democratic 
ideals. Irrefutably, a state simply cannot perpetually 
oppress a significant portion of the population under its 
control and, at the same time, remain a true democracy. 
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Impact on Common Economic/Water Security 
Finally, it is apparent that the status quo is not 
conducive to either common economic or common water 
security. The status quo means a continuation of the 
conflict, which, it has been seen, entails considerable 
direct and indirect cost for both sides. The most salient 
of these costs is the enormous diversion of human and 
material resources away from factors which contribute to 
economic development and stability. For the Palestinians, 
the economic status quo is particularly insufferable simply 
from the point of view that had they been permitted to 
become economically independent and to trade with Israel 
under some form of free (rather than forced) economic 
cooperation, their weak economy would have been comparably 
much stronger. 6 
In terms of the supply of water, the previous chapter 
pointed out that present circumstances reveal that a deficit 
already exists in Israel, Jordan and the territories. Only 
by effecting a change in the status quo--a termination of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict--will the parties be able to 
create the sort of cooperative political environment which 
is required for the equitable allocation of the region's 
scarce water resources. Such cooperation is also needed to 
enable the Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians to work 
together to explore ways to alleviate the area's serious 
quantitative and qualitative water problems. 
A RETURN TO 1967? 
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Since the present status quo clearly cannot serve as a 
basis for the settlement of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
perhaps a solution can be achieved by a return to the pre-
Six-Day-War status quo. After all, some would argue, it is 
precisely Israel's occupation of Arab lands that is the root 
cause of the overall Arab-Israeli predicament. Remove the 
primary source of the problem, so the reasoning goes, and a 
termination of the conflict would be at hand. Unfortunately, 
this argument not only ignores the present-day reality in 
the West Bank and Gaza strip, it also seemingly omits the 
two-decade history of open Arab hostility toward Israel prior 
to June 1967. 
Nevertheless, a return to the 1967 status quo merits 
examination. Some Israelis, while not subscribing to the 
above argument, still favor an Israeli withdrawal to the 
pre-1967 borders coupled with a takeover of the territories 
by the "moderate" King Hussein of Jordan. 7 As late as the 
mid-1980's, the Israeli Labor party, which regained power in 
the 1992 national election, openly advocated at least a 
limited version of this "Jordanian option" (less than full 
withdrawal, but a relinquishing of all territory evacuated 
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to Jordan). 8 Notably, a return to the former status quo or 
some other form of the Jordanian option is commonly 
discussed (usually unfavorably so) in the professional 
literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 9 
How feasible is this alternative when evaluated on the 
basis of the comprehensive common security framework? In 
particular, can the Israelis feel reasonably secure within 
the pre-1967 borders (the 1949 armistice lines)? Would the 
Palestinians be satisfied if their goal of political self-
determination were realized by virtue of naturalization, not 
in Palestine, but in Hashemite Jordan? 
Secure Borders 
Earlier it was argued that Israel, in accordance with 
the principles of common security, cannot achieve military 
security unilaterally by holding on to all of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. It does not necessarily follow, as M.Z. 
Diab suggests, that outright withdrawal to the 1949-1967 
borders would enable Israel to enjoy "a true and real sense 
of security. " 10 The Israelis point out that any revision of 
the present borders as part of a political settlement must 
provide for Israel's security for decades to come. Furthermore, 
although there exists a gap among the Israelis between the 
reality of their military strength and the psychology of 
their vulnerability, the notion of common security does 
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require that reasonable perceptions of threat be taken into 
consideration. The basic question, then, is whether a 
settlement involving the final disposition of the ter-
ritories should start from the premise that a major Arab 
military threat, however improbable at present, will remain 
a possibility for the foreseeable future. 
There are three major reasons, all of them overlooked 
by Diab, which render this assumption valid. First, the 
Arab states with which Israel must reach an accommodation, 
in addition to (and coincidentally with) a narrower Israeli-
Palestinian settlement, are all non-democracies. Unlike in 
Israel, with its safeguarded democratic institutions, there 
exists in these states no durable, democratic underpinning 
for the permanent upholding of political agreements entered 
into with other countries. Without full democratization, 
any present or future ruling regime in Syria, Jordan or Iraq 
formally committed to peace with Israel will face the 
eventuality of being forcefully supplanted by a radicalized 
(perhaps fundamentalist) opposition group which refuses to 
be bound by its predecessor's treaties. Such is the nature 
of the autocratic Arab world. 
Second, it is doubtful that these same Arab states can 
or will reduce one of the principal asymmetries of the 
conflict unfavorable to Israel. Israel's historic vulner-
ability to attack by Arab conventional land armies has 
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always been a function of asymmetrical force structures. 
Specifically, whereas Israel possesses a small standing army 
with large reserve units, its numerous Arab neighbors 
generally maintain relatively large standing forces with 
only a limited role for reserves (see Appendix A). 11 This 
enormous gap in Arab and Israeli standing forces engenders 
Israeli threat perceptions and increases the importance of 
topography and strategic depth for Israel's conventional 
defense. 
To be sure, a future arrangement whereby the more 
powerful Arab states were to reduce drastically their 
standing forces would allay Israeli concerns regarding this 
asymmetry. It is highly unlikely, however, that a Hafez 
Assad or Saddam Hussein, whose autocratic regimes rely on 
large standing armies for internal security as well as for 
other fronts, could convert the bulk of their active-duty 
forces to reserve units. In other words, this very real 
potential threat confronting Israel, for which it must 
compensate by retaining a geographic margin of security in 
some form, will likely not decrease in the foreseeable 
future. 12 
Third, it must be remembered that Arab belligerence) 
toward Israel long preceded the latter's acquisition of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip in June 1967. Though the plight of 
the Palestinians is now being given more than mere lip 
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service by most Arab governments, it is only one of several 
important components of this deep-rooted Arab animosity. 
Undeniably, manifestations abound of Arab attitudes toward 
Israel becoming more accepting of the reality of a permanent 
Jewish state in the region. Even so, popular and influ-
ential anti-Israeli elements presently commonplace in the 
Arab world are certain to persist indefinitely regardless of 
the amount of territory Israel concedes. 
The above considerations notwithstanding, it may appear 
that Israel's withdrawal from the entire Sinai Peninsula has 
established a workable precedent for full Israeli withdrawal 
from the West Bank and Gaza. In several important respects, 
however, the case of Sinai is not applicable to the West 
Bank in particular. 
In contrast to Sinai, where demilitarized zones keep 
Egyptian armored concentrations 200 kilometers from the 
Israeli border, the much narrower West Bank (maximum width 
of 57 km.) directly overlooks Israel's densely-populated 
coastal plain. Were Jordan to reacquire the West Bank, it 
would have to agree to its demilitarization. However, 
because of its much smaller size and over-concentrated Arab 
population centers, a demilitarized West Bank could be 
violated much more rapidly andjor clandestinely than the 
regime in Sinai. This would be particularly true with the 
strategic support of a militarily rehabilitated Iraq. 13 
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Moreover, whereas Israel's possession of the vast Sinai 
Peninsula badly overextended its defensive front lines, the 
Jordan River (the eastern border of the West Bank) 
constitutes a much shorter, more natural and more easily 
defensible frontier than the 1949 armistice boundary. 
A final point worth noting is that if history provides 
any indication, the inclination of an insecure Israeli state 
reduced to its pre-1967 borders would be to act preemptively 
(and disproportionately) against the Jordanians and 
Palestinians at the slightest penei~d provocation. One 
consequence of a total Israeli withdrawal, therefore, would 
be to increase indirectly Jordanian and Palestinian 
insecurity as well. (The underlying premise of common 
security, it must be remembered, is that one side cannot 
feel secure if the other side feels threatened.) 
It is the conclusion of this study that from the 
standpoint of Israe~'s military security, a w~thdrawal to 
the pre-June-1967 borders must be predicated on the 
maintenance of a substantial Israeli extraterritorial 
military presence in the strategic parts of the West Bank 
' ' 
(if not also Gaza). Such a scenario, which assumes the 
acquiescence of the Jordanians and Palestinians (by no means 
certain), clearly does not constitute an outright return to 
the status quo ante. (Extraterritorial security 
arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza will be examined in 
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the context of other, more feasible alternatives in Chapters 
6 and 7.) 
Self-Determination Through Jordanian Citizenship? 
Alongside Israel's physical (and psychological) 
security within the pre-1967 borders is the other key issue 
concerning the Jordanian option: the juxtaposition of 
Palestinian political self-determination with Jordanian 
sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 14 An 
Israeli-Palestinian common security framework, it has been 
seen, requires the fulfillment of self-determination for the 
1.9 million Palestinian inhabitants of the territories. 
Could this requisite for a secure peace be realized were 
Israel to hand over the territories to Jordan? Or would 
such a scenario be untenable for the Palestinians in that it 
would ultimately undermine the very essence of their 
national existence? 
On the surface, it seems quite feasible that 
Palestinian political expression could flourish in the 
Jordanian state, whose population is over fifty percent 
Palestinian to begin with. 15 This is the presupposition 
often articulated by former Israeli defense minister and 
long-time Likud Knesset member Ariel Sharon, who also notes 
that all of the Palestinian residents of the West Bank have 
retained their Jordanian citizenship. 16 This premise, 
however, is at best simplistic. It ignores a multitude of 
factors which clearly militate against the potentiality of 
Palestinian political self-determination by virtue of 
Jordanian citizenship. 
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For one thing, the Palestinian inhabitants of the West 
Bank (to say nothing of those living in Gaza) have never 
considered themselves as Jordanians. Arthur Day notes that 
even when Jordan ruled the West Bank, "the homogenizing 
process at work between Palestinians and East Bankers in 
East Bank Jordan between 1948 and 1967 had little effect on 
Palestinians in the West Bank ..• If anything, the latter 
[grew] increasingly disenchanted with Jordan. 1117 It is 
inconceivable, especially after the expulsion of the PLO 
from Jordan during the 1970 Jordanian-Palestinian civil war 
("Black September"), that the Palestinians in the West Bank 
would once again submit to Hashemite domination. 
Even more importantly, the PLO has built up so much 
vested interest--political, ideological and economic--that 
it would make little sense for it to permit its own 
absorption into an expanded Jordanian state. Indeed, over 
the last two decades, the notion of a separate Palestinian 
identity and political entity has become thoroughly 
ingrained not only in the Arab world but in the inter-
national community as well. 
The PLO's first major political victory came in 1974 in 
the form of formal Arab recognition of the Palestinians' 
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right to self-determination. At the October Arab summit in 
Rabat, the Arab states (including Jordan) officially and 
unanimously conferred upon the organization the status of 
"sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." 
One month later, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 
3237, formally granting the PLO observer capacity in that 
body. By the beginning of the 1980's, the PLO had 
established political relations with over eighty states, 
including the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact states, most of 
the Third World and several Western European countries. 18 
More recently (November 1988), the Palestine National 
Council, the PLO parliament-in-exile, unilaterally declared 
the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the 
territory which had been allotted to Arab Palestine by the 
1947 U.N. partition resolution. The Arab states were 
unanimous in according the "new state" official recognition. 
Since the onset of the intifada, opinion polls taken 
among the Arab residents of the West Bank and Gaza have 
consistently demonstrated their overwhelming support of the 
PLO--not King Hussein--as their representative. 19 This 
reality prompted Hussein to sever all administrative and 
legal ties between Jordan and the West Bank in July 1988. 
The king, moreover, has himself declared that were he to 
negotiate for the return of territory, he would promptly 
facilitate a Palestinian takeover of that territory within 
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the context of a Jordanian-Palestinian federal or confederal 
arrangement. 20 
Officially, it has been a jofut Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation negotiating with Israel in the ongoing Arab-
Israeli bilateral peace talks in Washington. From the 
beginning, however, the Palestinian members of the 
negotiating team have successfully maintained their total 
political independence. There are completely separate 
Israeli-Jordanian and Israeli-Palestinian negotiating 
agendas and negotiating tracks. Moreover, in clear recog-
nition of the independent-mindedness of the Palestinian 
people, the Israeli government under Yitzhak Rabin opened a 
secret dialogue with the PLO in early 1993 without even the 
knowledge of the Arab states, including Jordan. 
Clearly, self-determination, from the Palestinian point 
of view, means the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian 
political entity in the West Bank ~nd Gaza. The Pales-
tinians, who for so long have suffered in order to attain 
their ultimate goal of political independence, are not about 
to acquiesce to the takeover of the territories by Jordan or 
anyone else. After all the years of internal turmoil, 
insurrection and sacrifice, they have come too far 
politically to revert back to the unsatisfactory status quo 
of 1967. 
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Implications for Internal Stability 
For there to be lasting internal stability on both 
sides, a deficient final political settlement must not be 
imposed on either party from the "outside." Were Israel, 
Jordan and the u.s. to conspire in reaching a permanent 
agreement at the expense of Palestinian prospects for 
political independence--in clear breach of the principles of 
common security--the intifada would not cease. Rather, 
resistance in the territories would simply be redirected 
against what would surely be considered a Hashemite 
occupation of Palestinian lands (assuming such an agreement 
could even progress to the implementation stage in the first 
place). Not only would Jordan's internal order then be 
threatened, but, in addition, Israel itself would have to 
contend with a significantly destabilizing situation just 
beyond its borders. 
If King Hussein's pronouncements are to be believed 
(see above), they would appear to signal his full 
understanding of the security risks posed by this Jordanian 
option. These same risks cannot be ignored by the Israelis, 
who have a strong stake in the long-term stability of their 
moderate neighbor to the east. 
Nor is a return to the 1967 status quo likely to be 
favorable for the preservation of Israel's internal 
stability, which is already somewhat fragile. To be sure, 
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the Israelis could effectively resolve the fundamental 
dilemma concerning the ultimate nature of their state by 
ridding themselves of the burden represented by 1.9 million 
Palestinian Arabs in the territories. A return to the 
circumstances of 1967, however, would entail a full 
withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza coupled with a 
dismantling of aU of the Jewish settlements in these 
territories. These are concessions which the vast majority 
of Israelis would view as totally unacceptable security 
risks. 21 Any government of Israel which would attempt to 
force such concessions on the public would in all proba-
bility face widespread opposition and internal disorder of 
crisis proportions (including armed resistance by thousands 
of Jewish settlers in the territories). 22 
Impact on Common Economic/Water Security 
In Chapter 3 it was argued that with the current global 
trend toward the formation of common economic markets, it 
would seem that the region's only chance of competing 
successfully in international markets is by way of advanced 
economic cooperation. It was further noted that advanced 
cooperation would be required to enable the Arabs and 
Israelis to share equitably the region's scarce water 
resources. Full-scale bilateral and multilateral economic 
links of this kind clearly do not occur in a vacuum. 
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Rather, they necessitate a stable, amicable and cooperative 
political environment (although economic cooperation, in turn, 
can contribute to closer political ties between countries). 
Needless to say, a return to the 1967 status quo, with its 
likely perpetuation of insecurity and disruption of internal 
stability on both sides, would be incompatible with the 
creation of such a political atmosphere between the parties. 
Neither the present status quo (Israeli retention of 
the entire West Bank and Gaza) nor the former status quo 
(the so-called Jordanian option) are viable alternatives for 
the final disposition of the Israeli-administered terri-
tories. Chapter 5 will now examine what many Palestinians 
feel is the dejacto present status quo: Israeli annexation 
of the territories. 
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CHAPTER V 
UNILATERAL ISRAELI ANNEXATION 
The majority of the public is for [keeping] Eretz Yisrael 
but opposes the annexation of 1.5 million Palestinian 
Arabs; and it is no longer possible to think that you can 
annex the territory and at the same time deny Israeli 
citizenship to its inhabitants. And do not live with the 
illusion that you can expel them. 
--Rabbi Yoel Ben-Nun 
Gush Emunim (1988) 1 
If a comprehensive notion of common security is to 
serve as the basis of an Israeli-Palestinian political 
settlement, then clearly the Israelis cannot continue to 
dominate the Palestinians against their will. Nor can the 
Palestinians insist that the Israelis withdraw to the 
precarious pre-1967 borders without permitting them (or 
perhaps a neutral third party) to maintain a substantial 
military presence in the territory evacuated. 
A fundamental question which arises is whether Israel 
can retain its present frontiers without, at the same time, 
subjugating the Palestinians residing within these expanded 
borders. That is, could not Israel annex the West Bank and 
Gaza strip and either grant the Arab inhabitants full civil 
and political rights, actively encourage or compel the bulk 
of them to emigrate, or at least permit them to run their 
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day-to-day affairs without undue interference? This chapter 
examines the feasibility of Israeli annexation of the 
territories. Three scenarios, each unique in terms of its 
ramifications for the 1.9 million Palestinian Arabs of the 
territories, will be analyzed: 1} Israeli citizenship; 2) 
population transfer; and 3) autonomy. 
POLITICAL EQUALITY WITHIN A GREATER ISRAEL? 
The notion of Israel annexing the West Bank and Gaza 
and simultaneously granting the Arab inhabitants of these 
territories full civil and political rights has been around 
ever since the end of the 1967 Six-Day War. One of the 
original proponents of this idea was Eliezer Livneh, a 
founding father of the pro-annexationist Land of Israel 
Movement. In his 1972 book, Israel and the Crisis of Western 
Civilization, 2 Li V:r:teh presents an optimistic outlook for future 
Arab-Jewish relations in a Greater Entz nuaeL According to 
Livneh, the provisions in Israel's Declaration of Inde-
pendence ensuring full political rights for the Arabs of 
pre-1967 Israel (Israel has no constitution) should be 
equally applicable to the Arab residents of the territories 
once these areas were formally annexed to the Jewish state. 
Thus, the Palestinians, as equal citizens of a Greater 
Israel, would possess the right to vote in national and 
municipal elections and the right to hold public office. 
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Those who wished to maintain dual citizenship in Israel and 
one of the neighboring Arab states would be allowed to do 
so. 3 
In the conclusion of his chapter on Arab-Jewish 
relations, Livneh clearly envisages a binational Israeli 
state: 
The historical processes of Shivat Tzion [the 
return to Zion] make a favorable policy towards 
the Arabs necessary and possible. The Zionist 
thinkers knew that the Jews were not returning to 
an unpopulated country. The Arabs are part of the 
Israeli state and belong to its nature, including 
its cultural nature. Israel without the Arabs 
would be missing an important component. 4 
Among the Palestinians, Sari Nusseibeh first proposed 
the idea of Israeli citizenship for the Arab residents of 
the West Bank and Gaza in the summer of 1987. Nusseibeh 
reasoned that the Palestinians, because of their high birth 
rate, would constitute a majority of Greater Israel's 
population shortly after the turn of the century. With an 
Arab majority in the Knesset, they could work within 
Israel's own political system to undo the Jewish and Zionist 
foundation of the state, transforming Israel into an Arab 
Palestine. 5 
At first glance, the establishment of a binational 
Arab-Jewish state (whether it is called Israel or Palestine) 
would seem to reflect the very essence of the concept of 
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common security. With the appendage of the West Bank and 
Gaza to Israel proper, the Israelis would have their 
required secure and recognized borders (this assumes, of 
course, that the Arab states would formally agree to the 
formation of a binational state once the Palestinians 
accepted this plan). The Palestinians, as citizens of the 
new state, would gain true political self-determination on 
the basis of the territorial imperative (sovereignty in 
their homeland). Together, the two peoples could build an 
economically vibrant state in which all resources, including 
water, were shared equitably. A binational state, 
therefore, would seem to constitute Israeli-Palestinian 
coe~istence in the purest sense. 
Still, the case for 'the incorporation of the 
Palestinians into a Greater Israel overlooks two critical 
components of common security. Livneh, for his part, 
completely disregards the eventuality--indeed, the 
likelihood--of an Arab majority in an expanded Israeli 
state. As Chapter 3 noted, the Palestinian Arab population 
growth rate strongly indicates that Arab citizens of a 
Greater Israel would outnumber Israeli Jews within a half-
century. Could an Israel with an ever-increasing Arab 
majority remain a Jewish state? The answer is clearly no. 
This demographic threat is precisely the reason why 
Nusseibeh and other moderate Palestinians have, ironically, 
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proposed the same "solution" as that suggested by Israeli 
rightists like Livneh. If the Palestinians were willing to 
be patient, they could eventually achieve their dream of an 
independent PLO-led state from the Jordan River to the 
Mediterranean at the total expense of Jewish nationalism. 
It is the potential demise of Zionism, however, which is 
contrary to the notion of Israeli-Palestinian common 
security discussed in Chapter 3. 
Since he initially proposed the idea of a binational 
Israeli state, Nusseibeh has reevaluated the feasibility of 
this alternative and now openly favors a two-state solution 
to the conflict. 6 Indeed, the suggestion that the Pales-
tinians be incorporated into a Greater Israel met with 
immediate disapproval throughout the territories. As Emile 
Sahliyeh notes, the high degree of emotionalism associated 
with the Palestinian question and the deep-rooted enmity 
between the parties inherently limit the appeal of a 
binational state among the vast majority of Palestinians (if 
not also the Israelis) . 7 
Furthermore, the Palestinians want to be the ruling 
majority in a sovereign political entity now, not at some 
indeterminate, distant point in the future. Projections 
regarding the timing of the Arabs becoming a majority in a 
Greater Israel are based on current demographic trends. 
Unforeseen events--such as a resurgence of the high level of 
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Jewish immigration ·to Israel from the former Soviet Union 
experienced at the beginning of the 1990's--could signifi-
cantly delay the attainment of an Arab majority still 
further. Simply put, a settlement based on the granting of 
Israeli citizenship to the Palestinians would unquestionably 
trigger widespread, vehement Arab opposition, thus 
precluding the realization of a stable peace. 
POPULATION TRANSFER 
The notion of "transferring" the Arab inhabitants of 
the West Bank and Gaza to another Arab country, while 
actively advocated by only a fringe element in Israeli 
society, has gained legitimacy among some mainstream sectors 
of the population. 8 The intifada, the escalating tension 
between Jewish settlers and Palestinians in the territories 
and the increasing Palestinization of the Israeli Arabs have 
contributed to the creation of an emotion-laden atmosphere 
in which drastic solutions to the conflict are now seen as 
acceptable by some Israelis. In the 1992 national election, 
for example, Moledet (Homeland) , a radical right-wing party 
which has made the transfer concept the principal plank in 
its platform, won three of the 120 seats in the Knesset. In 
addition, Rafael Eitan•s nationalist Tzomet (Crossroads) 
party, which supports the eventual transfer of the Arab 
population of the refugee camps in the territories, sent 
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eight representatives to the parliament (an increase of six 
seats from the 1988 election). 
Transfer as a general concept is most prominently 
associated with Joseph Schechtman, one of the greatest 
authorities on Asian and European refugees. Writing in the 
1960's, Schechtman favored the transfer of ethnic groups as 
a solution to inordinately complex territorial/nationality 
conflicts which had proven to be insoluble in any other 
way. 9 Compulsory transfer, according to Schechtman, must be 
seen not as a retaliatory measure, but in essence as a 
preventive action necessitated when the integrity, security 
and stability of a state are endangered by a threatening 
minority: 
If large sections of an ethnic minority within a 
state consistently negate their very allegiance to 
the state; repeatedly create friction and 
conflicts ••. nourish irredentist tendencies and 
thus jeopardize the integrity of the state; and if 
all attempts at reconciling this minority and 
integrating it into the framework of common 
statehood fail, then--and only then--recourse may 
be taken to the grim necessity of population 
transfer. 10 
Transfer, of course, is not without precedent. In 
postwar Europe, for example, eight transfers were carried 
out between 1945 and 1955. Of these, three were bilateral 
exchanges of population (Polish-Soviet, Soviet-Czechoslovak 
and Hungarian-Czechoslovak); five involved the unilateral 
removal of ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia, Romania, 
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Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland. 11 In the Polish case, 
hundreds of thousands of Germans were expelled from 
territories which Poland had "recovered" as a result of the 
Allied victory over the Nazis. 12 Clearly, ethnic sifting 
was thought to be a radical, yet necessary solution to many 
of the territorial and minority-related problems in various 
European danger zones. 
This sort of thinking was also in evidence before the 
second w~rld war and in specific regard to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. In 1937, the British Peel Commission recommended 
the partition of Mandatory Palestine into two states--one 
Jewish, the other Arab. ·Acknowledging the· infeasibility of 
coexistence among bitter enemies with separate aspirations 
regarding the same land, the commission proposed the 
transfer of some 225,000 Arabs residing in the projected 
Jewish state in order to facilitate this scheme. 13 
Why not consider the massive Jewish exodus from Arab 
countries to Israel in the 1950's and 1960's (some 600,000 
Jews) the first step of a "population exchange," to be 
followed by a Palestinian exodus from the Israeli-
administered territories to Arab lands? In this way, Israel 
could seemingly retain the strategically important West Bank 
and Gaza and, simultaneously, eliminate the Arab demographic 
threat to its Jewish nature. Or, as the leader of the 
Moledet party, Rehavam Ze'evi, is fond of saying, "Anachnu kan, 
hem sham, veshalom a/ Yisrael!" ("We are here, they are there, and 
peace for Israel! ") . 14 
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Aside from the salient moral considerations concerning 
the notion of transfer, no other scenario for the dispo-
sition of the territories is as unrealistic and contrary to 
the principles of common security. For one thing, whereas 
Schechtman notes that a transfer operation must be 
compulsory (as opposed to voluntary) to be efficacious, he 
acknowledges that international jurists generally regard 
unconditional compulsory transfer to be inconsistent with 
democratic concepts of human rights. He therefore concludes 
that, "For persons who should choose to remain [as 
individual citizens] in the country of their residence, 
there would be no question of forcible transfer [emphasis 
added] • " 15 
Schechtman apparently believes that as presumably loyal 
citizens, those individuals opting to be exempted from 
transfer could in no way endanger the integrity of the state 
in which they resided (or perhaps there would be so many 
legal andjor bureaucratic barriers to appealing the transfer 
successfully that few would apply for exemption). As was 
argued above, this is clearly not the case for Palestinians 
who would choose to become citizens of a Greater Israel. 
For it is precisely as law-abiding citizens that the 
Palestinians, as the future majority, could eventually 
undermine the Jewish and Zionist nature of the Israeli 
state. 
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In order to eliminate this Arab demographic threat, 
therefore, a population transfer conducted by the Israelis 
would have to be non-voluntary and virtually unappealable. 
Yet, in terms of physical security, internal stability and 
economic prosperity, Israeli annexation of the territories 
coupled with a truly compulsory transfer would be profoundly 
antithetical to the interests of both sides. 
Assuming that such an operation could be carried out, 
what sort of physical (and psychological) security and 
communal stability could be enjoyed by the hundreds of 
thousands of Palestinians who would be uprooted from their 
homeland? How could Palestinian families survive over the 
long run the loss of their homes, businesses and property, 
even assuming Israeli compensation? Realistically, no Arab 
state would be able (economically) or willing (politically) 
to absorb a sufficient number of the expelled Palestinian 
population to ease its plight. By and large, the trans-
ferees would thus end up unwanted, homeless and jobless 
refugees, becoming further embittered and radicalized. 
Likewise, the inevitable costs to the Israelis of such 
a course of action would be staggering. A one-sided, 
compulsory transfer of the Palestinian inhabitants of the 
territories would be an overt and excessive violation of the 
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common security principle proscribing unilateral security 
"gains" at the expense of the adversary. In addition to the 
obvious moral price, the attempted implementation of a 
transfer would exacerbate the Arabs' collective hostility 
toward--and suspicion and fear of--Israel, thus further 
intensifying the Arab-Israeli conflict. Specifically, 
Israel's Arab neighbors, which would undoubtedly regard such 
an act as a casus belli, would have no choice but to go to war 
with Israel. Egypt, the only Arab country to have formal 
diplomatic relations with the Jewish state, would be under 
immense pressure from within and without to abrogate the 
Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and join in the military 
effort against Israel. 
A population transfer, moreover, would deeply alienate 
the overwhelming majority of the international community 
(including the United States), most of Diaspora Jewry and 
many Israelis themselves who would no longer feel that they 
were living in a democratic state. Not only would the U.S. 
and other Western countries terminate all foreign economic 
and military aid to Israel, but severe U.N.-imposed economic 
and political sanctions against the latter would likely be 
forthcoming. In such difficult and destabilizing circum-
stances, the Israelis would lack physical, psychological and 
economic security, and their internal cohesion would be 
seriously undermined. One can only reasonably conclude, 
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therefore, that a compulsory population transfer of the West 
Bank and Gazan Arabs would have catastrophic consequences 
for the Israelis themselves as well as the transferees. 
A final point which needs to be stressed relates back 
to the concept of common security as an underlying philos-
ophy of conflict-resolution. This study has focused on the 
theorized capacity and suitability of the common security 
framework to resolve a seemingly intractable conflict in 
which each party: 1) has legitimate, security-related claims 
that are inextricably bound up with the vital interests of 
the other side; and 2) poses a credible threat to the 
security of the other side. It is only through mutual 
compromise and cooperation that the parties can extricate 
themselves from their common predicament. 
Population transfer, by contrast, constitutes a unilateral 
"solution" to what is presumed to be a strictly one-
dimensional conflict in which the security of one party 
(i.e., a state) is endangered by another (i.e., an ethnic 
minority residing within territory controlled by that 
state). The notion of transferring the Arabs from the 
territories presumes--incorrectly--that the sole cause of 
the problem is the general Arab threat to Israel's security. 
It thus demonstrates absolute disregard for the other half 
of the equation--Israel as a threat to Palestinian national 
survival. If transfer were truly a viable option for the 
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ultimate disposition of the West Bank and Gaza, there would 
seem to be an even stronger justification for transferring 
the minority of Jewish settlers out of these territories and 
making them homogeneously Arab. 
AUTONOMY 
The third version of Israeli annexation would take 
place in conjunction with autonomy for the Palestinians. 
Historically, autonomous arrangements have been conceived of 
to appease (and control) members of a large ethnic group who 
are citizens of the state in which they reside, such as the 
Tamils and Sikhs (India), the Basques and Catalonians 
(Spain), the Eritreans (Ethiopia) and the Kurds (Iraq). 16 
Most recently, the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten 
autonomous enclaves was the basis of the initial U.N.-
sponsored peace plan to end the bloody civil war among that 
state's Serbian, Croatian and Muslim populations. 
Nevertheless, as was argued above, the notion of Israeli 
citizenship for the Palestinian residents of a Greater 
Israel is not a viable option, even were it to be connected 
with a liberal autonomous arrangement for the West Bank and 
Gazan Arabs. Any potential Israeli-Palestinian autonomy 
scheme, therefore, could not be predicated on true 
Palestinian incorporation into Israel. 
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Autonomy is a rather nebulous concept. The 1978 Camp 
David Accords signed by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat called for the 
provision of "full autonomy to the [Palestinian] 
inhabitants" of the West Bank and Gaza under a "self-
governing authority. 1117 However, no unambiguous definition 
of "full autonomy" is provided in the text of the accords. 
Consequently, the Israelis and Egyptians held vastly 
different views concerning the content of the proposed 
autonomy, which never converged in the subsequent autonomy 
negotiations. 18 
One distinction often made in the literature on 
autonomy is personal, or administrative, autonomy versus 
territorial autonomy. 19 Begin's narrow interpretation of 
autonomy was of the personal variety. His plan envisioned a 
locally elected Palestinian administration and judiciary 
which were to exercise personal jurisdiction in the areas of 
education, religion, industry, commerce, agriculture, 
tourism, housing, welfare, refugee rehabilitation, health, 
and local law enforcement. In addition, the Palestinians 
were to choose between Israeli, Jordanian or Egyptian 
citizenship. Excluded from this arrangement was even 
limited Palestinian sovereignty over any West Bank or Gazan 
territory; thus, matters pertaining to foreign policy, 
military security, internal order and land use were to be 
left solely to the Israelis.~ 
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Ariel Sharon, a long-time proponent of Begin's notion 
of autonomy, favors the creation of Palestinian autonomous 
regions with no territorial contiguity. 21 According to 
Sharon's plan, the widely scattered Jewish-populated areas 
of the West Bank and Gaza would be annexed to Israel. The 
Arab inhabitants of the non-annexed portions of the terri-
tories would be granted personal autonomy (here, Sharon is 
not clear regarding who would have ultimate sovereign 
control over these non-annexed areas). The minority of West 
Bank and Gazan Arabs ·coming under Israeli sovereignty, like 
the Palestinians of the autonomous enclaves, would continue 
to be full-fledged citizens of Jordan. They could therefore 
vote in Jordanian parliamentary elections and hold office in 
the Jordanian government. 22 
This scenario of de~cw Israeli annexation of all or 
nearly all of the West Bank and Gaza is compatible with the 
fallacious notion held by Sharon, Rafael Israeli and other 
right-wing Israelis that Jordan is the Palestinian state. 23 
In fact, historically, geographically, culturally and 
politically, Jordan is not Palestine. 24 Moreover, Sharon's 
and Israeli's suggestion that Arab Palestine be based on the 
East Bank of the Jordan is, in effect, tantamount to the 
Jordanian option, only whhout any Arab territorial 
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sovereignty-in the West Bank and Gaza. It has already been 
demonstrated that even the non-watered-down version of the 
Jordanian option is contrary to the concept of common 
security, particularly regarding the requirement of 
Pal~stinian political self-determination (see Chapter 4). 
Territorial Autonomy 
An ostensibly more promising alternative to Palestinian 
administrative autonomy linked to Jordanian citizenship is 
the notion of Palestinian territorial autonomy within a 
Greater Israel. According to the latter scheme, the 
Palestinians, though non-citizens, would gain those powers 
which Hurst Hannum identifies with full territorial 
autonomy: 1) a locally elected legislative body with a 
degree of independent authority; 2) a locally elected or 
appointed chief executive; 3) an independent local judiciary 
with full responsibility for interpreting local laws; and 
4) a liberal power-sharing arrangement between the 
autonomous and central governments which would deal with 
matters of joint concern, such as public order, the 
exploitation of natural resources, trade, and transportation 
and communications facilities. (The autonomous entity would 
have virtually full competence to deal with a wide range of 
other matters, including education, religion, industry, 
agriculture, land use and planning, housing and welfare.) 25 
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Israeli annexation of the territories in conjunction 
with full Palestinian territorial autonomy in the West Bank 
and Gaza (excluding certain Jewish-populated areas in the 
vicinity of Jerusalem) may seem to meet most of the 
requirements for an Israeli-Palestinian peace based on 
common security. Israel would retain the strategic depth 
afforded by the appendage of the West Bank, minus the Arab 
demographic threat to its Jewish character. At the same 
time, the Palestinians would enjoy a high degree of 
independent political expression in what they consider to be 
a part of their historic homeland. In other words, the same 
territory could potentially satisfy both sides' physical and 
psychological security needs and, in addition, the 
Palestinians' collective identity needs. Moreover, power-
sharing in areas of common concern should facilitate 
Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation, including the 
equitable allocation of scarce water resources. 
A scenario involving Palestinian territorial autonomy, 
then, contains some positive features. Nevertheless, there 
are two major problems with this alternative. One problem 
concerns Israeli security within the overall context of the 
wider Arab-Israeli conflict; the other pertains to the 
requisite elements of Palestinian self-determination. 
The above scenario assumes that Israel's Arab neighbors 
would acquiesce to Israel's annexation of the West Bank 
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(including East Jerusalem) and Gaza. Yet, even were the 
Palestinians·to accept territorial autonomy as a final 
solution (itself a dubious proposition for reasons to be 
discussed shortly), it is almost inconceivable that the Arab 
states would reconcile themselves to permanent Jewish rule 
over what they regard as indisputably Arab lands. Retention 
of the territories by Israel serves as a perpetual reminder 
of the humiliating collective Arab failure of June 1967. 26 
Israeli annexation of these lands would not only fail to 
remove a significant ideological-political stimulus 
underlying Arab belligerency toward the Jewish state, it 
would undoubtedly exacerbate it. In this sense, Israel, 
even with expanded borders, would continue to face a very 
real collective Arab threat to its physical security. 
Autonomy v. Self-Determination 
To understand the other aspect by virtue of which the 
territorial autonomy alternative breaks down, it is 
important to answer the question: Can political self-
determination be achieved through full autonomy? That is, 
can Palestinian territorial autonomy be equated with 
Palestinian political independence? 
The meaning and content of the principle of self-
determination by "national" groups are somewhat vague and 
imprecise. Nevertheless, the 1960 Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
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(U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514), the 1970 
Declaration on Friendly Relations (U.N.G.A. Resolution 2625) 
and two international covenants on human rights all define 
the right to self-determination in a similar manner. 27 
Specifically, each refers to it as the right of all peoples 
to determine, without external interference, their 
"political status" and to pursue freely their "economic, 
social and cultural development. 1128 Furthermore, the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations states: 
The establishment of a sovereign and independent 
state, the free association or integration with an 
independent State or-the emergence into any other 
political status freely determined by a people 
constitute modes of implementing the right of 
self-determination by that people. 29 
To be sure, the debate concerning whether the right to 
self-determination is jus cogens (widely acknowledged law) , 
and, if so, whether it is applicable to the Palestinian case 
in particular, will remain contentious (and irresolvable 
insofar as this paper is concerned). The point here, 
however, is that it is clearly the above conception of self-
determination whose fulfillment the Palestinians require to 
end their struggle against the Israelis. The notion of 
common security does not make judgments on the moral or 
legal validity of this Palestinian demand. Rather, it 
requires only that this lowest common denominator of the 
Palestinian consensus be implemented without jeopardizing 
Israel's vital security interests. 
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Hurst Hannum notes that territorial autonomy is not 
equivalent to full political self-determination as described 
above30 (though it may be considered a lesser form of self-
determination if it is the ultimate will of the population 
in question). He further states that the autonomous entity 
"should not expect to be immune from the influence of [the 
central government]" and that its powers must be exercised 
only "within the overall framework of the fundamental norms of the 
state [emphasis added]. "31 Notably, all matters relating to 
military security and foreign policy are to remain strictly 
under the control of the central government. 
From the Palestinian perspective, then, territorial 
autonomy is a smokescreen for continued domination by Israel 
and the perpetual subordination of Palestinian Arab 
interests to what are often antithetical Jewish/Zionist 
objectives. Such a scenario would seem to be inherently at 
odds with the basic precepts of Israeli-Palestinian common 
security. Another alternative, therefore, must be found. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE FEDERAL APPROACH: SELF-RULE AND SHARED RULE 
Peace has existed in the Middle East only under conditions 
when now-conventional notions of sovereignty have been 
drastically limited and principles of shared power have 
operated in their place. 
--Daniel J. Elazar1 
If neither Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders 
nor Israeli annexation of the West Bank and Gaza are 
feasible alternatives, what other options for a political 
settlement exist? Perhaps a realistic solution can be found 
by considering some sort of federal arrangement among the 
Israelis and Palestinians which combines self-rule and 
shared rule within the same territory. Indeed, according to 
the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, nearly sixty 
countries have already applied federal solutions to 
accommodate ethnic heterogeneity within their boundaries. 2 
Federalism is deemed promising by proponents because it 
transcends the original European notion of sovereign 
statehood, which, they argue, is wholly inappropriate for 
the Middle East with its mosaic of populations. 3 Notably, 
this inventive alternative, unlike the largely zero-sum 
options of full Israeli withdrawal or Israeli annexation, 
,/ 
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possesses many features that are predominantly positive-sum 
in nature. 
Various types of federal schemes have been suggested as 
potential solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, for example, propose a 
.confederative framework between Israel, Jordan and a 
"Palestinian entity to be constituted in the West Bank and 
Gaza."4 The confederation would adopt a binding consti-
tution which would obligate the Palestinian entity to remain 
demilitarized and to refrain from allying itself militarily 
with any other states. This common constitution could not 
be amended or abrogated except by unanimous agreement among 
the three constituent members. The authors, moreover, 
envisage an Israeli extraterritorial military presence in 
the Jordan Valley and an early-warning station in the West 
Bank to be operated jointly by Israelis, Palestinians and 
Jordanians. 5 
Similarly, Daniel Elazar, a world-renown champion of 
federalism, favors "a Palestinian-Jordanian federation in 
new boundaries that will reflect Israel's security needs, 
overlaid by a confederation with Israel [emphasis added]."6 
The Palestinian-Jordanian federation would consist of two or 
three constituent states (either Jordan-Palestine or Jordan, 
the West Bank and Gaza) with one over-arching federal 
government. The confederation, in essence a permanent 
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constitutional union between the latter and Israel, would be 
responsible for military security in the West Bank and Gaza, 
allocation of common water resources and economic and fiscal 
coordination. 7 
Such a confederation-federation combination, Elazar 
contends, would satisfy the vital interests of all the 
parties: 
The Palestinians would get their state, albeit as 
a federal state rather than a separately 
independent one, and also a guaranteed share in 
the common governance of the Arab [constituent) 
state. Jordan would continue to have a standing 
west of the [Jordan) river. Israel would get 
secure borders, recognition by its Arab neighbors, 
and a continuing relationship with those parts of 
the historic Land of Israel not within its full 
political jurisdiction. 8 
Clearly, Elazar, as well as other proponents of an 
Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, believes that 
the federal approach offers an equitable solution of the 
conflict. To be sure, a confederative arrangement would 
seem to satisfy, at least in part, several of the 
requirements of common security: the maintenance of the 
parties• physical security, the achievement of Palestinian 
self-determination, the preservation of Israel's Jewish and 
democratic nature and the development of economic and water 
cooperation. It remains to be seen, however, whether this 
is the optimal solution. 
123 
IMPACT ON MILITARY SECURITY 
Elazar argues that only his confederative option, 
unlike a "two-state" solution, would provide adequate 
security to each of the parties, Israel in particular. This 
argument is largely predicated on the claim that an 
independent Palestinian Arab state west of the Jordan River 
would pose an unacceptable level of risk not only to Israel 
but to Jordan and the Palestinians as well (this claim is 
challenged in the next chapter). According to Elazar, the 
establishment of such a state would deprive Israel of 
"secure" borders and threaten to undermine the Hashemite 
regime in Jordan, over half of whose population is Pales-
tinian. As a relatively poor state, its creation would also 
subject the Palestinian Arab community to perpetual 
instability and internecine warfare. 9 
By contrast, a confederation between Jordan/Palestine 
and Israel, with the latter's borders "adjusted" to provide 
it with a degree of strategic depth, would ultimately rely 
on a joint defensive presence to meet the common security 
needs of the Jewish and Arab inhabitants of the West Bank 
and Gaza. Israel, moreover, would serve as a guarantor to 
the Palestinians and Jordanians that each would abide by its 
federal obligations vis-a-vis the other, including security-
related agreements. 10 According to Elazar, "The only way 
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that a Palestinian link with Jordan would ensure protection 
for the Palestinian Arabs [from Hashemite subjugation] would 
be if it also included an Israeli presence. 1111 (Schiff and 
Ya'ari add that only close cooperation between the confed-
erative partners could yield positive results in countering 
common terrorist threats from extremists. 12 ) Military 
security, then, would be achieved in large part by expanding 
Israel's borders and by giving the three constituent members 
a common stake in each other's defense. 
The creation of a positive-sum system of cross linkages 
(in this particular context, military linkages) is critical 
to the establishment and maintenance of peace based on 
common security. However, the demarcation of boundaries--in 
this case, the extension of one party's borders at the 
expense of the other--is contrary to the notion of common 
security. 13 Elazar acknowledges this zero-sum nature of 
border delineation. Indeed, he attempts to circumvent the 
problem by proposing that each of the constituent members of 
the confederation would possess secondary territorial rights 
(to be determined in negotiations between the parties) 
across its primary borders. 14 
Nevertheless, the border adjustments Elazar 
suggests--Israeli annexation of "those segments of Judea, 
Samaria and Gaza needed for security purposes or so 
intensively settled by Israeli Jews as to be appropriately 
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part of the Jewish state" 15--are glaringly one-sided. It 
is difficult to accept, therefore, that limited extra-
territorial rights could compensate the Palestinians for a 
formal renunciation of their claims to primary sovereignty 
over these lands. Here, Elazar's assertion that his 
confederative scheme would ensure Israel's physical security 
ceases to be convincing. It rests on the dubious assumption 
that the Palestinians and Israel's Arab neighbors would 
acquiesce to the Jewish state's de facto absorption of 
whatever territory the Israelis deemed necessary for the 
establishment of defensible borders! 
MEANINGFUL SELF-DETERMINATION? 
A confederative arrangement including the Arab 
residents of the West Bank and Gaza could go a long way in 
satisfying Palestinian aspirations for political self-
determination. Both the Palestinian federated state 
envisioned by Elazar and the Palestinian entity proposed by 
Schiff and Ya'ari would enjoy a high degree of political 
independence (from Jordan as well as Israel) and thereby 
possess substantial self-governing powers. 16 Thus, for the 
first time ever, the Palestinians would ultimately achieve a 
meaningful share in virtually every aspect of their 
governance. 
; 
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This provision of self-rule notwithstanding, does the 
confederation-federation alternative go far enough in 
meeting the requirement of Palestinian self-determination? 
According to one widely accepted definition of self-
determination, federation with an existing independent state 
is only one of several legitimate means by which it may be 
implemented: the establishment of a sovereign independent 
state is another (see Chapter 5, the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations). This is precisely Elazar's point when he 
states, "Separate politically sovereign statehood in the 
classic European mold is not the only way to secure self-
determination ... The Palestinians will have to achieve self-
determination through federal arrangements." 17 
Still, the Palestinians universally demand independent 
statehood and might not be content with anything less. That 
is, they will not terminate their struggle against Israel 
until statehood is realized (see section on Palestinian 
Dissatisfaction and Internal Stability, below). Perhaps the 
most relevant question here is whether "separate politically 
sovereign statehood," in some form, could be achieved by the 
Palestinians without it being inimical to Israel's vital 
security interests. This question will be examined in 
detail in the following chapter. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL'S JEWISH AND DEMOCRATIC NATURE 
On the one hand, a confederative solution would 
eliminate Israel's long-time demographic problem by 
detaching from Israeli sovereignty the vast majority of the 
Palestinian Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza. 
While the latter would be citizens of the confederation 
(based on their citizenship in the Palestinian federated 
state or entity), they could not vote in Israeli national 
elections. For the small minority of Palestinians residing 
in territory annexed by Israel, a choice could be offered: 
either Israeli or Palestinian citizenship. The existing 
Israeli Arab population would retain its full citizenship. 
On the other hand, a confederation between 
Palestine/Jordan and Israel could create an entirely new 
demographic problem for the latter. The permanent linkage 
of Israel to a Palestinian-Jordanian federation would, in 
effect, mean the Jewish state's constituent membership in a 
confederation whose majority would likely be Arab within a 
relatively short time. Elazar, acknowledging this poten-
tiality, proposes that the confederation be governed through 
a joint council composed of an equal number of Israeli and 
PalestinianjJordanian (non-Israeli Arab) representatives. 18 
Would an equally-weighted Arab-Israeli framework of 
governance be stable over the long run? If Lebanon's 
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confessional system of government provides any clues, the 
answer is probably not. Should the population of the 
confederation eventually consist of an ever-increasing Arab 
majority, the Palestinians and Jordanians, like the Lebanese 
Shi'ites in their struggle against the Maronites, might 
naturally demand an increasing share of power. Because the 
Palestinian-Jordanian federation would be looking out for 
its own interests first, the implications for Israel of 
ceding the latter a controlling share of power would be 
serious. Yet, were Israel to resist a change in the power 
structure, the entire arrangement could collapse, as it did 
in Lebanon. 19 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND SHARING OF WATER RESOURCES 
Common economic security, it has been seen, requires 
the establishment of bilateral economic ties which will 
reinforce interdependence, thereby creating for both sides a 
permanent mutual interest in the durability of peaceful 
relations. This is particularly true with respect to the 
Israelis and Palestinians, who have a quarter-decade history 
of economic interdependence. Whatever political settlement 
is ultimately agreed upon, it must take into consideration 
the existing network of economic linkages and infrastructure 
(i.e., water resources, roads, electricity grids and 
communications lines) connecting Israel to the territories. 
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Thus, a severing of Israeli-Palestinian economic ties would 
not only be contrary to common security and therefore 
imprudent, it would be virtually impossible. 
In theory, at least, no organizational mechanism is 
more naturally suited to the development of economic inte-
gration (i.e., a common market) and the strengthening of 
interdependence (i.e., a system of cross linkages) than a 
federal arrangement between separate political entities. A 
confederation between Israel and Palestine/Jordan would 
integrate the three diverse economies into a single, 
potentially prosperous economic framework. Economic 
cooperation, in turn, should stimulate the generation of 
joint-ventures and an influx of foreign investment, some of 
which would contribute to the resolution of region-wide 
problems such as water and the environment. Additionally, a 
confederative arrangement would offer the parties a shared 
responsibility in the allocation of scarce water resources 
which are common to the entire area and do not respect 
political boundaries. 
The provision of mutual economic and water security, 
then, would be the most salient benefit of the above confed-
erative option. Whether it is unreasonable to expect that 
an economic union between Israel, Jordan and an independent 
Palestinian state would similarly secure such a benefit is a 
question which still must be explored (Chapter 7). 
PALESTINIAN DISSATISFACTION AND INTERNAL STABILITY 
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According to the notion of common security, an Israeli-
Palestinian political settlement must be supported on each 
side by a majority strong enough to overcome deep societal 
cleavages over the question of the West Bank and Gaza. 
Otherwise, the resultant internal discord within one or both 
societies could lead to civil war, threatening to spill over 
into neighboring states and thereby undermining their 
security as well. 
Elazar's proposed confederation would involve Israeli 
annexation of most of the Jewish territorial pockets in the 
West Bank and extraterritorial status for the remaining 
Jewish settlements, which would fall outside Israel's 
primary jurisdiction. 20 With the extension of Israel's 
permanent borders and no need to dismantle any Jewish 
settlements, it is a virtual certainty that the vast 
majority of Israelis would approve of this confederative 
approach to a settlement. 
By contrast, Elazar offers no evidence that an adequate 
majority of the Palestinian Arabs would consent to a fed-
erated mini-state solution. On the contrary, he seems to 
overlook (or underestimate) the Palestinians' potential 
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reaction to a considerable expansion of Israeli national 
territory at their own expense and to a rejection of their 
universal demand for an independent state. It is quite 
conceivable that Arab resistance to such a settlement would 
reach beyond the extremist, rejectionist elements to more 
moderate Palestinian circles, none of which have thus far 
been willing to forsake their shared minimum goal of full 
sovereign statehood. Moreover, even in the unlikelihood 
that violent protest did not ensue from the outset of such a 
peace agreement, Palestinian opposition to its perpetuation 
might emerge later were Israel's confederative power to 
become increasingly incommensurate with its relative 
population size. 
The issue here is not whether the Palestinians would 
accept a federal link with Jordan. Historically, there have 
been several indications that at least mainstream Pales-
tinians would ultimately agree to a Jordanian-Palestinian 
confederation. It should not be surprising, however, that 
the Palestinians insist on full independence first, prior to 
yielding a degree of sovereignty to a larger entity. 21 That 
is, it appears that only sovereign statehood would reassure 
the Palestinians that they could enter into a federal 
relationship with Jordan (let alone Israel) on the basis of 
political symmetry rather than subservience to the 
Hashemites (or to the Israelis). 
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Elazar fails to address adequately the question of how 
federated statehood would ensure Palestinian national 
survival over the long run. Were a substantial portion of 
the Palestinian population to perceive that the final 
settlement lacked in this regard due to their persistent 
fear of domination by Israel or Jordan, the envisioned peace 
could be a mere delusion. If, on the one hand, support for 
the agreement were to exist only among the more moderate, 
pro-Jordanian Arabs, might not Palestinian society become 
increasingly polarized, effectively inhibiting 
implementation of the settlement? 
On the other hand, were a one-sided confederative 
solution imposed on the Palestinians (and implemented) 
against their will, their ensuing discontent would surely be 
universal. The result might be the very escalation of 
"terrorism" which, paradoxically, Schiff and Ya'ari claim a 
confederative security arrangement is needed to contain. 22 
In the latter case, Israel might feel compelled to react 
harshly in the West Bank and Gaza, perhaps by returning a 
substantial military presence to these areas. Such a move, 
in turn, would jeopardize the entire confederative scheme. 
Clearly, a confederative relationship between Israel 
and Palestine/Jordan, though it contained some of the 
positive-sum elements required by common security, would 
nevertheless confront several serious pitfalls. Widespread 
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Palestinian dissatisfaction with a self-governing 
arrangement that fell short of sovereign independent 
statehood could not be ruled out. With no way to predict 
authoritatively whether such opposition would be insur-
mountable, only one other alternative, itself problematic, 
remains: an independent Palestinian state west of the 
Jordan River. This option is analyzed in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER VII 
ARAB PALESTINE 
The cornerstone is the concept of Palestinian sovereignty. 
Not half-sovereignty, or quasi-sovereignty or ersatz 
sovereignty. But a sovereign, independent Palestinian 
state ... There is no reason why the concept of Palestinian 
sovereignty should not accommodate provisions designed to 
allay legitimate fears of neighbors on a reasonable and, 
preferably, reciprocal basis. 
--Wal id Khal idi 1 
What are the characteristics of an independent 
Palestinian state west of the Jordan which could satisfy the 
basic requirements of common security and thereby make it a 
feasible alternative for a political settlement? Where 
would its final borders lie? Would it have to be totally 
demilitarized? Should it join into a confederative 
relationship with Jordan andjor Israel? 
In order to meet the criteria set out in this study, a 
Palestinian state must be sufficiently independent and 
sovereign to satisfy the minimum Palestinian Arab demands 
for political self-determination. At the same time, it must 
be sufficiently circumscribed to ensure that it does not 
undermine the physical security of Israel {not to mention 
Jordan). Additionally, the establishment of a Palestinian 
state west of the Jordan must: 1) detach from Israeli 
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sovereignty the vast majority of the Arab inhabitants of the 
West Bank and Gaza; 2) be supported by strong majorities on 
both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian border; and 3) permit 
meaningful regional economic integration, including 
cooperation in the allocation of scarce water resources. 
THE ULTIMATE FORM OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
According to Daniel Elazar, Middle East scholars and 
political leaders have overemphasized the 18th-century 
European notion of political sovereignty by equating "self-
determination" with this prototype for sovereign statehood. 2 
Other modes of self-determination, he argues, would--or 
should--satisfy Palestinian Arab demands for political 
independence (see Chapter 6). To be sure, an arrangement 
offering less than separate, sovereign statehood, such as 
Elazar's federated state, could conceivably provide the 
Palestinians with meaningful self-governance. Nevertheless, 
the self-rule/shared rule formula disregards entrenched 
Palestinian pene~~m that it would not ensure Palestinian 
national survival over the long run. 
Unquestionably, no other form of political self-
determination would satisfy Palestinian nationalist 
aspirations more than the creation of a sovereign 
independent state. Moreover, from the Palestinian per-
spective, as the position of Walid Khalidi suggests (see 
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quotation above), full independence need not be antithetical 
to Israel's security. Still, for the establishment of a 
Palestinian state to adhere to the principles of common 
security, it would have to reassure the Israelis themselves 
that it was not inimical to their vital interests. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAELI MILITARY SECURITY 
In Chapter 4, this study concluded that, from a 
military security standpoint, it would be imprudent for 
Israel to withdraw unconditionally to the pre-1967 borders. 
Specifically, Israel would require a margin of security in 
the form of annexed territory or extraterritorial rights to 
compensate it for the asymmetrical level of risk which would 
be imposed on it (relative to the Arabs) by a political 
settlement involving territorial compromise. This asymmetry 
is due to: 1) the loss of strategically important territory 
which Israel would have to concede as part of a settlement; 
2) the autocratic nature of Israel's Arab enemies; 3) the 
enormous gap in Arab and Israeli standing forces, which 
likely will not be sufficiently reduced in the foreseeable 
future; and 4) the persistence of deep-rooted anti-Israeli 
sentiment in the Arab world (see, Chapter 4, Secure 
Borders). 
The establishment of a sovereign, independent 
Palestinian state, therefore, must be predicated on the 
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premise that its territory (i.e., the high ground of the 
West Bank) could be used by a coalition of Arab states to 
launch a massive military invasion of Israel. Though this 
Arab state threat is dormant at present, common security 
entails the diminution of long-term as well as immediate-
term threats. 
Opponents of an independent Arab Palestine west of the 
Jordan take this conclusion one step further by arguing that 
the new state itself would represent an unacceptable risk to 
Israel. Elazar, for example, notes the "worrisome" threat 
of "irreconcilables" (secular radicals and Islamic funda-
mentalists) in the Palestinian state. 3 The latter, so 
labeled because they would presumably be dissatisfied with a 
small state limited to the West Bank and Gaza, would seek to 
continue their irredentist struggle against Israel by 
carrying out terrorist acts across the border. Warns 
Elazar, "All the Israeli coastal areas and the Jerusalem 
area--where six out of seven Israelis live--would be in the 
gunsights of individual terrorists. 114 These irreconcilables, 
moreover, would have access to a sophisticated level of 
weaponry, including mobile surface-to-air and surface-to-
surface missiles. 5 
Louis Beres concurs with Elazar's assessment. Beres 
warns of "PLO rejectionists" in the new state committing 
violent acts against Israel as a manifestation of their 
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continued struggle for total "national liberation."6 Even 
if it were able to withstand takeover by radical insurgents, 
he argues, "[Arab] Palestine would inevitably become a 
favored launching-point for renewed terrorism against 
Israel."7 
That a political settlement should start from the 
premise that there will always be extremist Palestinian 
cells which harbor the desire to "liberate" all of Palestine 
is not in and of itself unreasonable. The arguments of 
Elazar and Beres, however, are suspect on at least two 
important points. 
First, the establishment of a Palestinian state should 
go a long way in reducing both the means for and the 
practicality of continued Palestinian terrorism. The 
creation of an independent Arab Palestine would immediately 
divert most Palestinian energies and resources away from 
irredentism and into the enormous and engrossing tasks of 
state building. Moreover, the fledgling Palestinian govern-
ment would possess the resources of a state apparatus and 
command the support of a strong majority of the populace. 
It would be quite capable, therefore, of either co-opting, 
isolating or eradicating those elements which might desire 
to sabotage the peace treaty with Israel. 8 
Second, the existence of a relatively weak Palestinian 
state would, in effect, serve as a hostage against continued 
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terrorism. Upon realizing statehood, most Palestinians 
would suddenly have powerful vested interests (political and 
economic) in refraining from andjor preventing any 
provocations to Israel. To be sure, they would be made to 
understand that any serious attempt to revive their 
irredentist struggle against Israel, whether their 
leadership sponsored or merely condoned such efforts, would 
constitute a casus belli and result in massive Israeli 
retaliation. In the latter case, Israel, according to the 
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, would easily be able to 
overrun the neighboring Palestinian state: 
The balance of military power between Israel and 
the prospective Palestinian state would be so one-
sided that such a state--even if it so desired--
could not alone constitute a serious threat to 
Israel's security and survival. Indeed, Israel is 
not likely to face serious military difficulties 
should it decide to reassert its control over the 
territory of the newly created state. 9 
Thus, the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza 
would have every incentive to exhort their government as 
well as each other to act responsibly vis-a-vis Israel. 
Otherwise, they could lose in a matter of days--perhaps even 
hours--all that had been achieved through years of struggle. 
The constraining factors of statehood notwithstanding, 
Elazar notes that "we have all too many examples of peoples 
for whom statehood has not brought moderation, but simply 
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more power to do mischief." 10 Yet, the only recent example 
he cites--the tyrannical reign of the Khmer Rouge under Pol 
Pot in Cambodia11 --is hardly applicable to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Unlike the PLO or the fundamentalist 
Hamas movement,. the Khmer Rouge was backed by a world power 
(i.e., China) and was not opposed by a military force even 
remotely as powerful as Israel's. 
Moreover, while no one can predict with a high degree 
of certainty the future behavior of the various Palestinian 
groups after statehood is secured, two reasonable conclu-
sions can be drawn. First, the intifada in general and the 
terrorism it spawns against Israeli citizens in particular 
is sure to continue and perhaps escalate if sovereign Palestinian 
statehood is not achieved within a reasonable timeframe. 
Second, whereas isolated incidents of terrorism against 
Israelis could persist after the establishment of an Arab 
Palestine, such acts, while sometimes fatal, would in no way 
endanger the survival of Israel. 
It is therefore the conclusion of this paper that, on 
the one hand, an independent Palestinian state in and of itself 
would not constitute a significant military threat to 
Israel. This should remain so for the foreseeable future 
assuming the new state were required, as part of a political 
settlement, to limit its offensive military capabilities 
(see, Conclusion, Partial Demilitarization). 
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On the other hand, Israel should be compensated, in the 
least zero-sum manner possible, for its cession of 
territorial military assets in the face of the continuing 
collective Arab state threat. Such a margin of security is 
justified by the common security principle of achieving 
parity by reducing strategic asymmetries (in this case, 
between Israel and the Arab states as a whole). It could 
take the form of border adjustments (territorial annexation) 
or extraterritorial security arrangements. 
SOVEREIGNTY V. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS 
Over the past decade, some advocates of territorial 
compromise, especially among Israeli scholars and analysts, 
have been divided into two schools of thought. The 
traditional Israeli proponents of "territory for peace" 
favor new political borders which would incorporate into 
Israel the most strategically important parts of the West 
Bank and Gaza. The remaining non-annexed portions of the 
territories would be returned to Arab sovereignty, either 
Jordanian or Palestinian or both. By contrast, the second 
school of thought favors the establishment of security 
arrangements, perhaps an Israeli extraterritorial military 
presence, in strategic territory evacuated. The maintenance 
of such arrangements would presumably permit Israel to cede 
the entirety of the West Bank and Gaza to the Arabs. 12 
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The distinguishing variable between the two schools is 
not a difference of opinion on the feasibility of a return 
to the status quo ante of June 1967 (i.e., a return by 
Israel to its former borders). Rather, the distinction lies 
in opposing political assessments on the type of Israeli 
sovereignty (if any) in territories now disputed which could 
secure Arab acceptance of a settlement while simultaneously 
ensuring Israeli security. 13 
Jerome Slater, a proponent of the second school of 
thought, argues that Israel need not retain any sovereignty 
in the West Bank or Gaza. 14 Slater suggests that a multi-
national peacekeeping force indefinitely stationed in a 
Palestinian state west of the Jordan "could serve the same 
intelligence, early warning, deterrence, and to some extent 
even war-fighting functions as an Israeli [extraterritorial] 
force. "15 He notes, furthermore, that such a force would 
have an added advantage relative to the deployment of 
Israeli troops in territory evacuated or Israeli annexation 
of parts of the West Bank and Gaza. Specifically, the 
presence of an international force would be more politically 
palatable to the Palestinians than would these latter two 
alternatives, both of which would constitute a much more 
significant infringement on their claimed sovereignty. 16 
Irrefutably, the deployment of a multinational 
peacekeeping force would be more acceptable to the 
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Palestinians than an Israeli military presence or Israeli 
annexation. However, Slater's assertion that "in the remote 
case of an all-out Arab attack," the "war-fighting 
capabilities" of an international force would be adequate to 
prevent a seizure of the high ground of the West Bank17 is 
quite tenuous. 
The extent of the military capabilities of an 
international force at any given point in time may be 
determined at the whim of political leaders whose self-
interests militate against effective collective security. 
That is, the deterrence of aggression against states outside 
their own immediate region may be deemed too costly by those 
governments whose military forces would be used in the 
effort. Although a somewhat different set of variables 
comes into play, the current indecisiveness of the 
international community regarding a course of action in war-
torn Bosnia-Herzegovina may be instructive here. As this 
collective inability to deter Serbian aggression suggests, 
it is unlikely that the Israelis--or, for that matter, the 
Palestinians--would be willing to entrust their long-term 
security needs (on the eastern front) to the presence of an 
international force alone. 
Another important factor to be considered in the 
sovereignty versus security arrangements debate is long-term 
stability. Notably, the demarcation of new, mutually 
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recognized borders (assuming the parties are capable of 
concluding an agreement) is likely to be a more durable 
solution than the establishment of security arrangements 
involving the use of foreign forces. The former approach 
should lessen the expectations of either party that it could 
eventually modify the post-settlement status quo. By 
contrast, the deployment of a peacekeeping force, which by 
its very nature limits a state's sovereignty within its own 
territory, might be seen by the affected state as only a 
temporary infringement to be eliminated when future 
circumstances warranted. 18 
The retention by Israel of an extraterritorial military 
presence or the deployment of a multinational force, such as 
that proposed by Slater, would circumscribe the sovereignty 
of the Palestinians in the most strategic areas of the West 
Bank. Yet, over time, it would be natural for the Pales-
tinian state to seek to reassert its full sovereign control 
by lobbying for the removal of the foreign troops. (Indeed, 
a third party like the U.N. might itself conclude at some 
point that its forces were no longer essential to keep the 
peace and therefore resolve to disband them.) 
It may be particularly instructive in this regard that, 
in late 1992, Egypt notified Israel of its desire for the 
removal of the Multinational Forces and Observers in Sinai. 
This deployment, which separates the armies of Egypt and 
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Israel, has increasingly become the target of nationalist 
sentiment. The Egyptians argue that these foreign troops 
are no longer necessary now that the 1979 peace treaty 
between the two countries has, in their view, withstood the 
test of time. The Israelis, taking a long-term perspective, 
believe that the durability of the treaty must be measured 
in terms of several decades, not merely several years. 19 
Clearly, if a Palestinian state is to be created, 
negotiated border adjustments would accord the final 
political settlement more built-in stability and security 
reassurances than would the stationing of foreign 
peacekeeping forces. What sort of modifications to the 
pre-1967 borders would not be inordinately zero-sum in 
nature and could therefore be implemented by agreement of 
the parties? 
From a purely military perspective, the Israelis would 
prefer to retain most of the Jordan River Valley and to 
widen their country's narrow waist by absorbing the western 
foothills and ridges of the Samarian mountains. In all 
likelihood, they would also seek to maintain an extra-
territorial military presence along the eastern crest of the 
mountain ridge. All three of these areas are strategically 
important to Israel in terms of both topography and 
strategic depth (see Chapter 3, Footnotes 11 and 12). 
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On the one hand, the problem with Israeli annexation of 
the western slopes of the Samarian mountains (including 
Ariel, the second largest Jewish settlement in the West 
Bank) is that it is a thoroughly zero-sum proposition. This 
territory, while it overlooks Israel's vulnerable coastal 
plain, lies to the immediate west of the densely populated 
Arab heartland of the West Bank. Israel could only annex 
this land to the total detriment of the Palestinians, whose 
compact state would be rendered too small to be economically 
(and psychologically) viable. 
With certain relatively minor border adjustments 
(below), an international peacekeeping force including--and 
perhaps commanded by--American troops operating intelligence 
and early-warning installations should be sufficient for 
Israel's security needs on the mountain ridge. It would 
have to be deployed along the eastern as well as western 
crest, thereby eliminating the need for what would surely be 
an unwelcome Israeli military presence on Palestinian 
territory. At the same time, counterpart stations could 
monitor Israeli military preparations and maneuvers, thereby 
providing reassurances to the Palestinians. 
On the other hand, Israeli retention of the majority of 
the Jordan Valley20 would be substantially less intrusive 
upon the Palestinians because this narrow strip of territory 
(Appendix B) is only sparsely populated with Palestinian 
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Arabs. 21 As a defensive asset, it would enable the Israelis 
themselves to control the entrances to almost all of the 
major east-west axes leading up from the Jordan River to the 
Samarian mountains. 
Admittedly, there is no guarantee that Israeli 
absorption of the Jordan Valley and a resultant Palestinian 
state virtually surrounded by Israel would prove acceptable 
to the Palestinians. It can only be assumed that the less 
territory Israel seeks to annex and the fewer the number of 
Arabs inhabiting that territory, the higher the probability 
of Palestinian acquiescence. 
From a common security perspective, however, this new 
geographic configuration would have the advantage of 
effectively and unalterably meshing the physical security of 
the Palestinians with that of the Israelis. Future military 
perils to the enclosed Palestinian state (e.g., those which 
could be posed by rejectionist states like Iraq or Iran) 
would surely be recognized as threats to Israeli territory 
and vice-versa. The presence of Israeli brigades throughout 
the valley and the deployment of a U.S.-led international 
force along the mountain ridges would thus serve as a 
powerful two-pronged deterrent against major threats not 
only to Israel's coastal plain but to the heartland of an Arab Palestine 
~weU (Other minor border modifications are discussed in 
the final chapter.) 
INTERNAL STABILITY: SUPPORT FOR THE SETTLEMENT 
150 
An independent Palestinian state in almost the entirety 
of the West Bank and Gaza, even with some limitations on its 
sovereignty (below), would be more likely to fulfill 
Palestinian nationalist aspirations than any of the other 
alternatives already discussed in this paper. In addition, 
a satisfactory solution--perhaps a special status--would 
have to be formulated for East Jerusalem (see, Conclusion, 
The Question of Jerusalem). Notably, one prominent study of 
what many consider to be the most hard-line segment of the 
Palestinian population--the Gazan refugees whose original 
homes were inside present-day Israel--indicates that even 
they would accept something approximating the above 
scenario. 22 Indeed, there likely would be no more generous 
a proposal forthcoming from Israel or any outside 
intermediary. 
Would a sufficiently strong majority of Israelis agree 
to the notion of Palestinian statehood? Surely, the estab-
lishment of a neighboring Palestinian state, were it simply 
to gloss over Israeli security concerns or require the 
dismantlement of all Jewish settlements in the West Bank, 
would prove unacceptable to the vast majority of Israelis. 
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The envisaged Palestinian state above should reassure 
the Israelis that their physical security would not be 
jeopardized by its creation. Still, the presence of over 
100,000 Jewish settlers residing in territory which would 
become Arab Palestine would clearly be a cause for concern 
to both sides. A political settlement intent on uprooting 
these communities could trigger violent opposition, 
particularly among militant Israeli settlers determined to 
remain in the territories. 23 Even if such an agreement 
could be implemented, the vocal Jewish radical right might 
pose a destabilizing factor inside Israel, polarizing the 
public to the point of internecine strife. In the latter 
case, the incipient Palestinian state could be an easy 
target for Jewish extremist groups striving to undermine the 
peace treaty. 
Acknowledging this danger, Mark Heller and Sari 
Nusseibeh suggest an arrangement combining financial 
incentives for voluntary "repatriation" of Jewish settlers 
to Israel with a system of permanent residency for those 
individual Israeli citizens wishing to remain in the West 
Bank or Gaza. 24 The assumption underlying this proposal is 
that those settlers motivated primarily by pragmatic rather 
than ideological considerations--eighty percent of the 
settler population by one estimation25--would lose their 
incentive to remain in their present homes. Heller and 
Nusseibeh believe that with available, subsidized housing 
inside Israel, the vast majority of them would choose to 
relocate.u 
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The remaining Jewish population centers in the West 
Bank and Gaza, while subject to the authority and laws of an 
Arab Palestine, could perhaps enjoy a degree of communal 
autonomy similar to that of Arab municipalities in Israel. 27 
Though this scheme mandates Jewish submission to Arab 
sovereignty, it might appeal to most Israelis in that it 
also entails a formal Palestinian recognition of the right 
of Jews, as individuals, to live in the West Bank. In the 
final analysis, it is essential that eighty to ninety 
percent of the Israeli public would support this sort of 
arrangement. Only a majority of this size could empower the 
government to isolate and neutralize effectively any radical 
right-wing opposition to the final settlement. 
ELIMINATION OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC TIME BOMB 
The establishment of a Palestinian state with the 
suggested.borders (along with Palestinian citizenship for 
East Jerusalem's Arabs) would virtually eliminate the Arab 
demographic threat to Israel's democratic and Jewish nature. 
It would remove from Israeli rule the bulk of the Arab 
inhabitants of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip. 
Consequently, Israel's subjugation of a people against its 
153 
will would finally end, enabling the Jewish state to remain 
true to its democratic ideals. 
At the same time, this scenario involves Israel's 
absorption of only a negligible number of Arabs--perhaps a 
few hundred Palestinians residing in Israeli-annexed 
territory who would ultimately opt for Israeli citizenship 
(see Footnote 24). The Israelis, therefore, would not have 
to feel threatened by the eventuality of an Arab-dominated 
government rising to power and legislating the official 
demise of the state's Jewish and Zionist character. Most 
importantly, the existential dilemma which has been plaguing 
Israel for more than a quarter of a century would be 
resolved once and for all. 
COMMON ECONOMIC SECURITY OR SEVERANCE OF ECONOMIC TIES? 
In evaluating various alternatives for the final 
disposition of the territories, Daniel Elazar stresses the 
need for the West Bank and Gaza to maintain a close economic 
relationship with Israel and Jordan. 28 According to Elazar, 
any drastic transformation in the present web of economic 
linkages inextricably connecting the territories to Israel 
would inflict grave costs on the Israelis and, especially, 
the Palestinians. He concludes from this premise that a 
"repartition" of the territories to create a separate 
Palestinian state is totally infeasible. 29 
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To be sure, a federal arrangement (e.g., economic 
confederation) between the Israelis and Palestinians would 
be, as Elazar suggests, the most suitable option for facili-
tating their continued economic integration. It does not 
follow, however, that a political repartition of the West Bank 
and Gaza, one which accommodated Israel's vital security 
interests, would necessitate a severing of economic ties 
between Israel and the new state. To the contrary, it would 
still be very much in the best interests of a separate, 
independent Palestinian state to enter into a formal 
economic union with Israel and Jordan (see Chapter 3). 
Patrick Clawson notes that as the weakest partner, the 
Palestinians would stand to benefit the most from advanced 
economic cooperation with the Israelis and Jordanians. 30 
Such cooperation, he suggests, could take the form of a 
Middle East Benelux (after the economic union between 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). 31 It is hardly 
unreasonable, therefore, to expect the Palestinians to agree 
to the establishment of a similar tripartite common market 
as part of a quid pro quo for Israeli acceptance of an 
independent Palestinian state west of the Jordan. Notably, 
the proven durability of Benelux, created in 1960, demon-
strates that an economic confederation can fare well even 
though each of the constituent members is a separate 
sovereign state with its own agenda of national interests. 
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A full-fledged Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian common 
market would involve many, if not all, of the following 
features: 1) a joint customs tariff for imports; 2) a 
monetary union; 3) a free flow of labor and capital; 4) the 
integration of electricity grids and communication lines; 
and 5) common transport facilities (in particular, joint use 
of the Haifa, Eilat and Aqaba ports and a fully developed 
Gaza Port). 32 Extensive economic cooperation of this sort, 
far from disrupting the existing network of economic 
relationships and infrastructure connecting the territories 
to Israel, would only build on it. 
A Benelux-type economic confederation should prove 
profitable for each of the constituent members, particular-
ly because the three economies involved are strong in 
divergent, yet complementary areas. 33 At the same time, it 
would reinforce the economic interdependence of the parties, 
creating a system of cross linkages which would enhance 
their mutual interest in maintaining peaceful political 
relations. 
A FEDERAL ARRANGEMENT FOR WATER ALLOCATION 
At first glance, a political repartition of the 
territories to create a sovereign, independent state between 
Israel and Jordan might not seem conducive to resolving the 
region's acute water problems. This is, in part, because 
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many of the water sources in the area, such as the West Bank 
aquifers, do not respect political boundaries. Commonly 
held vital resources (e.g., water, oil) juxtaposed with a 
separation of sovereign control tends to be a recipe for 
conflict among the states of the Middle East. Historically, 
these states have placed their own water needs not only 
before those of their neighbors and of the region as a 
whole, but also before other concerns, like the environment. 
The addition of yet another state to the mix might intensify 
an already bitter struggle for scarce water resources. 
A final political settlement of this sort, therefore, 
must include a mechanism which would compel the parties 
(Israel, Palestine and Jordan) to share water equitably on 
the basis of need, access to external resources and 
compliance with common conservation regulations. such a 
mechanism could take the form of a federal water authority 
to be conceived within the framework of the tripartite 
economic confederation. The federal water authority would 
be governed by a council consisting of representatives of 
each country. It would oversee the allocation of the 
immediate region's water resources and the planning and 
implementation of joint projects, like desalination plants 
and water conveyance systems. To ensure its success, the 
governments of Israel, Palestine and Jordan would have to 
commit to yielding some of their innate decision-making 
powers to the council. 
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The establishment of a sovereign, independent Arab 
Palestine, under certain conditions, would generally satisfy 
each of the criteria set forth in the conceptual security 
framework of this paper. With, inter alia, final borders 
that accommodated Israel's legitimate security needs and the 
establishment of a tripartite federal water authority as 
part of a larger economic confederation, this alternative 
would have a more reasonable chance to produce a durable 
peace than any of the other scenarios previously discussed. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
The September 1993 Israeli-FLO interim arrangement on 
autonomy for the Palestinian inhabitants of the Gaza Strip 
and Jericho is clearly a watershed event in contemporary 
Middle East history. It is a necessary first step toward a 
mutual acknowledgement by the parties of one another's 
legitimate long-term security interests. Such an 
acknowledgement, in turn, reflects the fundamental principle 
underlying the notion of common security: one side of a 
conflict cannot feel secure if the other side feels 
threatened. Not until this principle is irreversibly 
instituted by the parties as the driving force governing 
Israeli-Palestinian relations will a final political 
settlement be possible. 
In the meantime, Israeli-FLO negotiations face 
significant obstacles, not the least of which is the 
vehement opposition already crystallizing on both sides. 
The risk of diplomatic impasse is considerable. This will 
be particularly the case if and when the final status talks 
begin to center on the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state, the alternative rated most favorably 
according to the conceptual framework presented in this 
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study. In addition to permanent borders and the existing 
Jewish settlements, other complex and contentious issues 
must be worked out to the satisfaction of both sides. Among 
the potential roadblocks are the status of Jerusalem, the 
extent of demilitarization of the Palestinian state, and the 
timeframe for implementation. 
THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM 
Most observers believe that the case of Jerusalem will 
prove to be the most difficult of all the problems addressed 
in the negotiations. Even the moderates on both sides who 
are otherwise disposed toward compromise might cling to 
entirely inflexible positions when it comes to Jerusalem, a 
city whose symbolic importance to both Jews and Moslems 
should not be underestimated. Whereas the Israelis are 
almost unanimous in their insistence that Jerusalem remain a 
united city and the eternal capital of Israel, the Pales-
tinians are equally adamant in their demand that East 
Jerusalem be the capital of their future state. 
Still, the notion of common security can once again be 
invoked to enable the parties to overcome seemingly ir-
reconcilable positions. A creative, positive-sum solution 
predicated on common security would purposely obscure the 
issue of sovereignty in such a way that both the Israelis and 
Palestinians could claim that their primary interests had 
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been secured. For example, a mutually acceptable solution 
could take the form of an Israeli-Palestinian federated county 
encompassing an expanded East Jerusalem (out to Ma'ale 
Adumim), the southern portion of the city from the 1949 
armistice line to the current municipal boundary, and the 
protruding "finger" of northern Jerusalem (see Appendix B). 
West Jerusalem, which is not disputed, would remain under 
absolute Israeli sovereignty. 1 
The territory within the newly established county would 
be divided into Jewish and Arab municipalities along the 
lines of the standard u.s. county. For example, areas such 
as Neve Ya'akov, East Talpiot, Gilo, and Ma'ale Adumim would 
constitute possible Jewish municipalities; neighborhoods 
like Anata, El-Ezariyya and Abu Dis would each be part of 
larger Arab districts. Generally, Jewish residents of the 
county would vote in Israeli national elections as well as 
countywide and individual municipal elections; Arab 
residents would participate in the latter two types of 
elections in addition to Palestinian national elections. 
The county would be governed by an overarching joint 
council, which could be co-chaired by an Israeli and a 
Palestinian. While the national seat of government of Arab 
Palestine would be located in East Jerusalem, Israel would 
164 
still maintain control of the federation's security against 
external threats. 2 
PARTIAL DEMILITARIZATION 
Israeli proponents of territorial compromise typically 
speak of the need to demilitarize any portions of the West 
Bank and Gaza evacuated by Israel as part of a political 
settlement. To be sure, limitations should be imposed on 
the military forces of the proposed Palestinian state. The 
most important of these constraints would be a ban on the 
acquisition of those weapons which would enable the Pales-
tinian military to partake in offensive operations (i.e., 
surface-to-surface missiles, tanks, artillery and combat 
aircraft). In addition, the Palestinian state would be 
prohibited by treaty from permitting foreign forces or 
military advisers, such as those of other Arab states, to be 
stationed in its territory. 
Notably, precedents exist whereby sovereign states 
(e.g., Japan) have found it in their best interests to 
comply with long-term military restrictions imposed on them 
within the context of a peace settlement. Similarly, the 
Palestinians would have to determine on a perpetual basis 
that upholding such a treaty obligation was in their 
national interests. A treaty provision that would un-
equivocally equate any breach of the demilitarization of 
165 
Palestinian terri tory to an act of war--and a casus belli for 
Israel--could serve this purpose. That is, it would provide 
the Palestinians with an obvious long-term incentive to com-
ply with the limitations imposed on their military forces. 
Nevertheless, a Palestinian state, as Mark Heller 
notes, would require some military capability, not only for 
internal security but for symbolic reasons as well. 3 More-
over, because of the above constraints, it would arguably be 
beneficial to the Palestinians to enter into a formal 
security alliance with Israel and Jordan. 
TIMEFRAME FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
Undoubtedly, the Palestinians desire statehood sooner 
rather than later. However, due to the asymmetrical nature 
of the concessions that would be required of the Israelis 
relative to the Palestinians (tangible territorial assets 
versus a formal renunciation of irredentist claims), the 
former would surely insist on a phased implementation. 
Politically, implementation in stages, whereby Israel would 
incrementally relinquish both territory and sovereign 
control, is a requirement for the success of this option. 
Specifically, it would create modalities of cooperation and 
co-existence which could serve as confidence-building 
measures for both peoples, particularly the security-
obsessed Israelis. Implementation of each successive stage 
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would be contingent upon satisfactory compliance by both 
sides with the interim agreements made in all prior phases. 
A phased implementation would also allow for a more 
orderly transfer of power and would provide the Palestinians 
the time necessary to develop fully their self-governing 
institutions. Nevertheless, it is equally important that 
the transition period not be so long that it provide 
ammunition to Palestinian opponents of the settlement who 
would claim that the phased implementation was really a 
smokescreen for continued Israeli control of the West Bank 
and Gaza. The timeframe, therefore, should be psycho-
logically satisfactory in terms of imparting hope on the 
Palestinian population of the territories that their 
political independence was truly within reach. A reasonable 
timeframe would be no less than five years but should 
probably not exceed eight. 
A FINAL WORD 
To ensure that a Palestinian state would not pose a 
threat to Israeli security or regional stability, its 
creation presupposes the implementation of at least three 
additional safeguards. In keeping with the spirit of common 
security, these safeguards would be highly beneficial to the 
well-being of the Palestinians as well. 
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First, Middle East peace cannot occur in a vacuum. An 
Israeli-Palestinian political settlement must take place 
within the context of an overall resolution of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. With an independent Palestinian state 
existing alongside their borders, the Israelis would feel 
reassured about their security only if, at a minimum, Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia also had established fully 
normalized relations with the Jewish state. 
Second, the economic viability of the incipient 
Palestinian state would be predicated on the generosity of 
the wealthier Arab guif states, Japan, the European Economic 
Community and the United States. Without a substantial 
infusion of funds into the West Bank and Gaza for economic 
development (e.g., infrastructure, modern industrial plant, 
port facilities and desalination), an economically weak Arab 
Palestine would be politically unstable and could upset the 
newly created regional equilibrium. 4 
The third safeguard is related to the second. A sudden 
and massive influx of refugees into Arab Palestine would 
clearly overwhelm the new state's absorptive capacity. 5 An 
economy suffering from soaring unemployment, high taxes, and 
a constant strain on housing and other infrastructure could 
become an ideal breeding ground for economically frustrated 
Palestinians seeking subversive, even irredentist, 
solutions. To preclude such a danger to both Israel and the 
new state, the Palestinians would have to agree as part of 
the final settlement to a staggered system of refugee 
absorption over several years. 
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An Israeli-Palestinian political settlement which 
satisfied the vital security interests of both sides would 
have an enormous ripple effect throughout the Middle East. 
On an ideological level, it would remove one of the 
underlying sources of the deep-rooted collective Arab 
animosity toward the Jewish state. On a pragmatic level, it 
would enable Israel and its Arab neighbors to combine 
resources and work together to resolve the daunting social 
and economic problems of the region which have never been 
adequately addressed. By cooperating to fight common 
threats rather than fighting each other, the Arabs and the 
Israelis would find themselves cultivating a new modus 
vivendi which could serve as the underpinning of a durable 
and comprehensive peace. 
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CHAPTER VIII NOTES 
1The approach to West Jerusalem through the Jerusalem 
Corridor should also be widened, permitting Israel to retain 
control over the main Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway. Specifi-
cally, Israeli annexation of a small territorial belt which 
included the Latrun Salient (Appendix B) would correct a 
conspicuous geographic anomaly created by the 1949 armistice 
lines. In return, the new Palestinian state should be 
allowed to incorporate fully those Arab villages which 
literally straddle the armistice boundary and thus 
constitute demogrophk anomalies (e.g., Barta'a and Baqa el 
Gharbiya). 
2For a discussion on possible solutions regarding 
Jerusalem, see, Daniel J. Elazar, Two Peoples ... One Land: 
Federal Solutions for Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan 
(Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1991) 147-170; 
Mark A. Heller and Sari Nusseibeh, No Trumpets, No Drums: A 
Two-State Settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1991) 114-124. For a detailed 
examination of federated county systems, see, John c. 
Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, The Metropolis: Its People, 
Politics and Economic Life (New York: Harper and Row, 1970) 
324-339. 
3Heller and Nusseibeh, op. cit., 66. 
4A major step in this direction has already been taken. 
At an international conference in Washington on October 1, 
1993, 43 countries pledged $2 billion over five years in 
assistance to the Palestinians as they prepare to assume 
administrative responsibility for the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho. Among the countries pledging were the u.s., the 
12-member European Community, Japan, saudi Arabia and 
Israel. 
5Heller and Nusseibeh estimate that 750,000 to one 
million Palestinian refugees--newcomers and returnees--would 
eventually immigrate to a new Palestinian state. See, 
Heller and Nusseibeh, op. cit., 90-91. 
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J:srael 
Population 4.55 
(millions) 
Active 141 
Military 
Manpower 
(thousands) 
Reserve 504 
Military 
Manpower 
(thousands) 
Combat 753 
Aircraft 
Tanks 3794 
Artillery 1100 
APPENDIX A 
MIDDLE EAST BALANCE OF POWER 
Egypt Syria Iraq a Jordan 
54.11 11.72 17.85 3.10 
448 404 1000 82.25 
604 400 850 35 
589 609 513 135 
2440 4050 5630 1150 
2380 2500 4500 690 
Source: Michael Widlanski, ed. , Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State? 
(Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political 
Studies, 1990). 
Iran 
54.37 
604.5 
350 
121 
530 
800 
8The Iraqi figures predate the 1991 Gulf War. The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (!ISS) estimates that Iraq lost 
up to 247 combat aircraft, 3,000 tanks and 2,140 artillery pieces 
during the war. Presently, Iraq is believed to have 382,500 men 
in its active forces (not including 25,000 paramilitary troops) 
and 650, 000 reservists. See, !ISS, The Military Balance, 1992-1993 
(London: Brassey's, 1992) 110-111. 
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